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of scale,[3] as we may call it, was accompanied by major changes not only in the positions occupied by individuals in Ngoni society but also in the form of Ngoni society itself. We have to analyse at this stage a non-repetitive process, by which the autonomous Ngoni state, organized by a segmentary residential system and an age-set system, was changed into a dependent unit in a system of Native Authorities forming part of a world-wide colonial empire. For this reason the details of the process are worth noting, for in Ngoni history they are unique and largely determine the form of modern Ngoni society. Having established this significant sequence of events, we are then in a position to look at the same set of facts in a wider context. For what is unique and non-repetitive for the Ngoni may be repetitive in a wider context. The Ngoni are only one tribe among a myriad of tribes, and what happened to them has also happened to many others. Similar sequences of events, each unique for the particular tribe concerned, have occurred throughout the world at various periods of time whenever small autonomous systems have been absorbed into large and more highly resourceful ones. We can therefore look at Ngoni history from 1880 onwards as either unique, from the point of view of the Ngoni, or as typical, or at least probably typical, of a repetitive process which has often occurred in the development of any empire.

Conveniently, at least some of the facts can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. We are no longer dependent only on oral tradition, but can refer to contemporary documents. These reflect in the main only the European side of Black-White relations, but even so their testimony is enlightening. I have therefore set out in full the history, mainly of external relations, of the Fort Jameson Ngoni from 1886 down to 1900 both with the intention of throwing light on how the transition was made from pre-conquest to modern society in this particular tribal instance, and also as an example of what seems probably an oft-repeated process in the history of any empire. A discussion of how typical the Ngoni experience is would take us beyond the bounds of this book. We should, however, bear in mind that the newer comparative method, as developed by Radcliffe-Brown and his followers, is as applicable to mammoth social forms, such as empires, as to small ones such as hordes, provided only that the right kind of data are available.

Our detailed documentation should extend down to modern times, but after 1900 there was a change in the kind of events that were documented, related as we shall see to a change in social relations, and we have to proceed somewhat differently.

[3] For the concept of scale, see Wilson, *Social change*, pp. 25 *ff*.

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2. *Portugal or Britain*

175 Several European powers were interested in the country into which the Ngoni moved in the 1870s. France and Germany both had a general interest in central Africa, and although their areas of greatest activity were elsewhere, they did not leave the country round Mpezeni entirely alone. The French explorer Giraud travelled through what is now the Northern Province of Northern Rhodesia and down the Shire Valley in 1883-5, and his compatriot Foà was in the region between Mpezeni and the Zambezi at various times between 1891 and 1897. The White Fathers, a Catholic order at that time recruited largely in France, began work in Bemba country to the north of Mpezeni, and on the Zambezi to the south, during the 1890s. In 1892 Major von Wissmann travelled up the Shire Valley on his way to consolidate the German interest in south-western Tanganyika.

The fate of the plateau bounded by the Luangwa, Zambezi and Shire valleys, with its healthy climate, good pastures, and alleged deposits of gold was, however, the particular concern not of France or Germany, but of Portugal and Britain. The Portuguese settlements on the east coast of Africa guarding the long route to India had been founded in the sixteenth century. The Portuguese soon discovered, or were shown by the Arabs who had been there before them, the Missale gold-mines some forty miles south of present-day Ngoniland. These mines could not compare with the richer treasures discovered south of the Zambezi but they were worth exploiting and there was always the prospect of further discoveries in the vicinity. However in the middle of the eighteenth century the Jesuits, who had been the most penetrating of the Portuguese explorers, were expelled from all Portuguese possessions, and interest in the region lapsed. At the end of the century the quest began for a route to link the Portuguese settlements on the east and west coasts. Pereira and Lacerda passed through Missale in 1796 and 1798 on their visits to the Lunda chief Kazembe and similar routes were followed by Baptista and Jose in 1811, by Monteiro and Gamitto in 1831 and by Silva Porto in 1854. These [439] travellers were interested mainly in ivory and minerals and in securing unmolested passage for their caravans from coast to coast. Although the Portuguese were anxious to keep Britain out of central Africa, the only attempt they made to colonize this portion of the interior was at a short-lived military post, north of Mpezeni's future country in the Luangwa Valley, occupied from 1827 to 1829 and then abandoned.[4]

[4] Poole, 'Portuguese settlement', p. 164. See Map B.

[Text continues on page 68]

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Livingstone was the first Briton to reach this area. In 1866 he passed through what was to become Mpezeni's country,[6] and in his journals he makes frequent references to Ngoni raids. Unfortunately his carriers would not take him to Ngoni villages and all he saw of Ngoni activity were burnt-out huts and dead bodies killed in battle. The accounts of his journeys stimulated British interest in the region round Lake Nyasa, a centre for the slave trade, and led to the arrival there of missionaries and settlers. In 1874 the Livingstonia Mission was founded and in 1883 a British consul was first appointed to the Shire Highlands.[6]

Mpezeni's country lay some distance from the main centres of British and Portuguese activity, but was not without importance. Apart from Missale, it was thought that there were other gold deposits to be found in the area. In contrast with their harried neighbours, the prosperous Ngoni with their herds of cattle attracted travellers while the pleasant climate of the plateau, compared with the hot valleys of Luangwa, Zambezi, and Nyasa, made it suitable for European colonization. Yet the Ngoni army was formidable, and had to be neutralized in some way if other settlements were to be safe. Mpezeni's country flanked several trade routes of importance from the Zambezi and Lake Nyasa inland to the sources of slaves and ivory. For these various reasons Mpezeni's country attracted the attention of traders and governments, those interested in benefiting by the slave trade as well as those seeking to end it. In addition towards the end of the century when it became clear that Africa was to be completely divided between the Powers, any territory, however inhospitable, that had not already been claimed attracted the attention of treaty-making explorers.

The first move towards incorporating the Fort Jameson Ngoni in a colonial empire was made by the Portuguese who had been stimulated by the increasing British interest in Nyasaland. In November 1888 the Governor-General of Moçambique instructed Wiese, a German[7] trader who had already made contact with Mpezeni, to lead an expedition to him. According to Johnston, Wiese and an associate were offered £2,000 to secure Mpezeni's submission to Portugal.[8] Wiese was well received and distributed flags to Mpezeni and his sons. The Portuguese regarded the

[6] *Last Journals*, i, p. 150.
[6] Johnston, *British Central Africa*, pp. 55-69.
[7] In *A & P*, 1890-1, lvii, p. 683, the Portuguese Foreign Minister describes Wiese as a Dutchman. This appears to be incorrect in the light of Wiese's contacts with the German Legation in Lisbon.
[8] Wiese, 'Expedição', p. 235; **49**, p. 13. (To save space, all public records will be identified by a serial number printed **bold face**, taken from the first column of the Bibliography, List C.)

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acceptance of these flags as acts of submission, a view echoed by the French explorer Foà. The British view, based on the observations of Sharpe and the statements of Ngoni envoys to Johnston in January 1890, was that no treaty was signed.[9] The official Portuguese report of the expedition records among other things that Mpezeni had been friendly to the Portuguese, that he accepted their flags, and said that their friends and enemies were also his, that he promised not to raid in their territory, and that he refused to see a British traveller [Sharpe] because he had not been recommended by the Portuguese. There is no specific mention of any agreement by which Mpezeni accepted Portuguese protection.[10] Whatever construction was put on these events by Europeans, either Portuguese or British, it seems unlikely that Mpezeni can have felt himself bound by his acceptance of a flag. Wiese evidently thought it necessary to point out to him that the flag was not to be used as an article of clothing.[11] Sharpe suggests that Wiese tried to make a treaty with the Cewa chief Mkanda, who had been driven out by the Ngoni; Wiese then intended to declare Mkanda the rightful owner of Mpezeni's country.[12]

The British Government had been reluctant to extend its commitments in the Lake Nyasa region beyond the appointment of a consul. During 1888-9, however, there was fighting at the north end of Lake Nyasa between Arabs and the African Lakes Company in which Lugard was involved. Rhodes's attention was attracted to the area and he offered Lugard a large subsidy to develop it.[13] This proof of Rhodes's interest emboldened the Foreign Office, and on 28 July 1889 Johnston arrived at the mouth of the Zambezi as the representative of the Foreign Office and of Rhodes and with the task of consolidating the British position in central Africa.

Johnston began at once to make treaties with as many chiefs as possible, spurred on by the activities of Pinto, a Portuguese engaged on a similar task. In August he sent Sharpe on a journey westward from the Shire Valley on which he made treaties with some of the chiefs lying south of Mpezeni and north of the Zambezi.[14] Sharpe returned to the Shire and was sent off again, this time to Mpezeni himself. He did not manage to see him. According to the Portu-

[9] *A & P*, 1890-1, lvii, p. 683; Foà, *Lac Nyassa*, pp. 298*f*; 16, fo. 146; 22, fo. 275; 49; 258.
[10] *Boletim Official de Moçambique*, No. 21 (24 May 1890), pp. 238-40.
[11] Wiese, 'Expedição', p. 488.
[12] 22, fo. 280, 311.
[13] Lugard, *East African Empire*, i, pp. 157-9, 202-7.
[14] 6, fo. 256; Sharpe, 'Journey between the Shire and Loangwa', pp. 150-7.

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175 648 guese, Mpezeni refused to see Sharpe, while according to Johnston Sharpe had used up his stock of presents before reaching Mpezeni and hence did not attempt to negotiate with him. Sharpe found Wiese at Mpezeni's with a Portuguese officer and on 11 December 1889 witnessed the formal presentation of a Portuguese flag to one of Nsingu's lieutenants, though, 'for reasons of correctness', he was not asked to sign the document officially recording the incident.[15]

Although Wiese was leading the Portuguese party, he spoke bitterly to Sharpe of the way in which the Portuguese had treated him and indicated to him and in a letter to Johnston that he might consider working in the British interest. Johnston replied in January 1890 with a letter of 'a non-compromising but vaguely reassuring character'.[16]

In March 1890 Sharpe began another journey to Mpezeni, this time with instructions from Johnston to make a treaty with Mpezeni and to 'buy' Wiese with an offer of up to £1,000 a year for three years. He arrived at Mpezeni's village on 24 March, only to find that Wiese had left for Tete over a month earlier, leaving behind him the Portuguese officer. Mpezeni kept Sharpe waiting for an interview until 4 April, and although friendly he refused to discuss a treaty or accept a British flag. Sharpe left a letter for Wiese, offering him £300 a year for his services, and departed for the Luangwa Valley. After an unprofitable trip he returned to Mpezeni's on 21 May, to find Wiese and the Portuguese officer on the point of leaving for a trading-trip to Kasungu. Wiese rejected Sharpe's offer of £300 a year and Sharpe was forced to return to Nyasa with both the principal aims of his expedition unaccomplished. He had, however, made a few treaties with non-Ngoni chiefs.[17] Thomson, another explorer who, like Sharpe, was employed by Rhodes's British South Africa Company, arrived in Ngoni country in December 1890 after a successful trip to the Lala. Thomson was greeted with hostility, sheltered with Wiese, and fled during the night.[18]

175 439 648 Johnston played a dual role in Nyasaland, for besides representing the British Foreign Office he was also responsible for the interests of Rhodes and the British South Africa Company, from

[15] 15, fo. 26-7; 16, fo. 144; *Boletim Official de Moçambique*, 21 (24 May 1890), p. 239.

[16] Wiese may have offered his services to Johnston before Sharpe arrived at Mpezeni's. cf. 49; 158, p. 62; 16, fo. 145-6.

[17] 9, fo. 30; 16, fo. 146; 22, fo. 274-95; Sharpe, 'Journey from Lake Nyassa', pp. 745, 749; Johnston, *British Central Africa*, p. 89; Wiese, 'Expedição', xi, pp. 412-31, 464-80.

[18] Thomson, 'Lake Bangweolo', p. 114; Wiese, 'Expedição', xi, p. 588.

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whom he received a subsidy. When that company was granted its first charter on 29 October 1889, its sphere of operations was restricted to south of the Zambezi. When Johnston began work north of the river the future division of responsibility between the Foreign Office and the B.S.A. Company was uncertain. On 21 September 1889 Buchanan, on Johnston's instructions, proclaimed a British Protectorate over the region round the Shire Highlands, and on 14 May 1891 this was superseded by the proclamation of a British Protectorate over approximately the whole of present-day Nyasaland. In April 1891 the Foreign Office sanctioned the extension of the B.S.A. Company's operations to the north of the Zambezi within the British sphere of influence, excluding Nyasaland. It was, however, still uncertain whether or not the administration of the Protectorate was to remain permanently separate from that of the B.S.A. Company's territory to the west. A complicated story of financial negotiations and of a quarrel between Johnston and Rhodes ended in an agreement whereby after 30 June 1895 all administrative connexion between the two territories ceased.[19]

The western boundary of the Protectorate proclaimed in 1891 was based on that laid down for the Conventional Basin of the Congo[20] at the Berlin West African Conference in 1885. This line, the Zambezi-Nyasa watershed, passed through the eastern portion of Mpezeni's country, leaving the greater portion of Ngoniland outside the Protectorate. The dividing line between the British and Portuguese spheres of influence was not finally determined until the Anglo-Portuguese agreement of 11 June 1891. Despite the Portuguese flags and Wiese's affirmations of friendship, the whole of Mpezeni's country was placed by this agreement in the British and not in the Portuguese sphere, as it had also been in the unratified convention of 20 August 1890.[21] As a consequence, then, of the proclamation of the Nyasaland Protectorate, the extension northwards of the B.S.A. Company's sphere of activity, and the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, Mpezeni's country was divided between the Protectorate and the B.S.A. Company's territory. In consequence of the agreement, or because Mpezeni was tired of them, Wiese and the Portuguese expedition left Ngoniland.

Despite this formal division Mpezeni had as yet, as Johnston was to point out six years later, 'ceded nothing to anybody'.[22] On

[19] *State papers*, lxxxi, p. 1009, No. 243; *London Gazette*, 15 May 1891 and 24 February 1893; *A & P*, 1890, li, pp. 634-40; *A & P*, 1895, lxxi, pp. 565-8; Johnston, *Story of my life*, p. 497.

[20] *A & P*, 1884-5, lv, p. 439.

[21] *A & P*, 1890-1, lvii, pp. 589, 625; *A & P*, 1890-1, xcvi, p. 420.

[22] 158, p. 63. cf. 158, p. 59.

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the other hand, Sharpe and Thomson had made treaties with some of the chiefs round about Mpezeni, and Johnston urged that Mpezeni had merely dispossessed these treaty-making chiefs and 'consequently declined to acknowledge him as ruling chief'. Mpezeni, he held, was a 'robber without rights'.[23] As a matter of policy Johnston supported the friendly matrilineal tribes rather than Mpezeni. He also opposed him because of the Ngoni raids which threatened the settled order he was trying to establish. He held that Mpezeni was such a scourge of the indigenous population that he must some day be dealt with, that he was an intrusive Zulu robber who must eventually be subdued and dethroned, when the country could be administered directly by Europeans or could be restored to the government of the rightful indigenous chieftains.[24] Even after Mpezeni had been defeated, the precipitating causes of the war were regarded by the Nyasaland Administration as only incidental, for 'The Angoni had, however, by their incessant raids into our territory made it a matter which sooner or later would have to be dealt with . . . '.[25]

One factor which delayed Johnston from acting as swiftly against Mpezeni as he did against the Yao and southern Ngoni was that Mpezeni was farther than they from the main artery of Nyasaland, Lake Nyasa and the Shire Valley. In any case Johnston was anxious not to take precipitate action with too few troops which might end in disaster. He was reluctant to allow the parties of prospectors and traders who entered Mpezeni's country to take arms with them lest they should provoke the Ngoni into attacking them before Johnston was ready. He was anxious to avoid having to face an alliance of all the various Ngoni groups. After the downfall of Lobengula in Southern Rhodesia in 1893, Ndebele refugees reached Mpezeni and according to some reports Lobengula himself was among them. Co-ordinated action by Mpezeni and the Ndebele was feared and, as we shall see, an attempt was in fact made by Chabisa to unite Mpezeni's forces with the Ngoni of northern Nyasaland. The only offensive action taken by the Nyasaland Administration prior to the final conflict in 1898 was in May 1896, when troops were moved from Kotakota to Kasungu in response to a report that Mpezeni was planning to kill some prospectors, but the report was found to be false and the expedition was called off.[26]

[23] 158, pp. 62-3.
[24] 132; 158, p. 61.
[25] *A & P*, 1899, lxiii, p. 253.
[26] 98; 132; 2[illegible], fo. 141; Warton in *African Review*, x, 216 (9 January 1897), p. 67.

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These events made the inclusion of Mpezeni's country in the British colonial empire highly likely. The way in which this would come about was still not obvious, nor had it yet been decided who should control the economic resources of the area. It was the struggle for economic control which in the end decided the political issue. Here again Wiese played a prominent part.

3. *Concession hunters*

From 1885, if not before, Wiese lived in Ngoni country and among the neighbouring tribes as a trader.[27] His wife, who lived with him part of the time in Mpezeni's country, was Doña Romana, a black Portuguese lady who owned some hundreds of slaves. Wiese's commercial objectives can be inferred from the conversation he had with Sharpe on this matter in May 1890, when he mentioned that he employed over two hundred and fifty of his wife's slaves as elephant-hunters, and that he was planning to employ two thousand men in trading expeditions to the Luapula, Garanganze and other distant places. He was also at that time planning to make war on a certain Cewa chief.[28]

According to Wiese's own account, he gained a number of concessions from chiefs and he was granted in 1887 various mining rights by the Portuguese Government in the territory to the south of Mpezeni. On 15 November 1886 Mpezeni orally granted him a concession for ninety-nine years and, Wiese claimed, this agreement was ratified in writing on 14 April 1891. Mpezeni, described as 'Paramount Chief of the Angoni (Zulus) and Sovereign Ruler over Maravia and Western Nyassaland', granted Wiese a concession in 'one part' of his country some 6,700 square miles in extent and reaching to within twelve miles of the Zambezi near Chicoa. In return for exclusive mineral, timber, water, railway and other rights, Wiese agreed to pay Mpezeni £200 annually and 1 per cent of his profits. Mpezeni reserved the rights of sovereignty over his people and the land, water and timber necessary to his subjects were guaranteed.[29] [31]

A few months before this written concession was drawn up, Bowler and Rankin, representing the comprehensively named Upper and Lower Zambezi Navigation, Exploration, Trading, Land-acquiring and Colonization Company, Limited, arrived in

[27] Lancaster, 'Chronology', p. 86, says that Wiese visited Mpezeni in 1881. Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 71, in another tentative chronology, follows him, although there is no mention of this visit in the body of Poole's book. Wiese himself appears not to mention any date earlier than 1885. See 40.

[28] 67, fo. 139; 22, fo. 285.

[29] 32, pp. 17-18.

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175 439 the country.[30] They joined Wiese in collecting concessions from the surrounding chiefs.[31]

175 439 648 A legal procedure for registering and recognizing concessions within the British sphere was established by Johnston on 18 July 1891.[32] Without recognition by Johnston's Land Court, a concession did not of itself establish a clear right to title under British law. The issue of this proclamation may have been prompted by Wiese's actions. In June, shortly before it was issued, Wiese was travelling to Europe with his concessions. He met Johnston at Quilimane and asked him to recognize them.[33] Johnston refused to do this. He particularly objected to the concession from Mpezeni, not only for its monopolies but also because it had not been signed by Mpezeni but only by a Portuguese allegedly acting on the chief's behalf, and because Mpezeni did not control the large area mentioned in the concession. Such land as he did control he had obtained only by dispossessing the earlier inhabitants. Johnston regarded Wiese as a slave trader who forced chiefs to make their mark on documents without explaining what the documents meant and without making any payment for the concessions obtained. He maintained that Mpezeni had never granted any rights to Wiese and wrote of the concession: 'I always refused to recognize his preposterous document.' He complained that Wiese tried to 'bounce the British Government into recognition of his (wholly unfounded) claims'. Johnston later argued that in order to conclude eight of his other treaties, Wiese must have travelled five hundred miles between 20 December and 23 January, an improbable occurrence.[34] Acting on this policy Johnston insisted, at Quilimane, that he must examine Wiese's concessions before he could pronounce on them. Wiese made a declaration before Johnston's deputy describing the concessions and went on his way to Europe, he maintaining he had thereby registered his concessions and Johnston maintaining he had not.[35]

Wiese's agents in London began corresponding with the Foreign Office in December 1891 pressing for the recognition of his

[30] Hole, *Making of Rhodesia*, p. 241; 17, fo. 390-1.

[31] Bradley, 'Salute to adventurers', p. 54, says Wiese bought concessions from Bowler and Rankin.

[32] 36; 58, fo. 420.

[33] 40, p. 33; 49, p. 14; 67, fo. 140; 81, fo. 144-5.

[34] 49; 81, fo. 148.

[35] There is some uncertainty about the date on which Wiese made his statement at Quilimane. Johnston refers to a declaration sworn to by Wiese before the Acting Vice-Consul on 7 June 1891. Bowler's letter to the Foreign Office was supported by a copy of a receipt for a fee paid for witnessing a signature, dated 27 June. cf. 35; 48, p. 15; 71.

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concessions. In January 1892 Wiese offered his services to Johnston as an agent, and in March repeated the offer. He seems to have mentioned the possibility of his leading the Ngoni in battle on behalf of the Administration. Johnston rejected these offers contemptuously along with similar offers made by Bowler, saying that he wanted Bowler and Wiese to remain in Europe. He also remained adamant in his refusal to recognize Wiese's concessions, although the Foreign Office itself continued to prevaricate on this issue.[36]

In 1891 or 1892 Wiese visited Lisbon in an effort to collect the £2,000 owing to him for his services to the Portuguese during 1888 and the following years. It was, however, in London that he tried to obtain financial backing so that he could begin to exploit his concessions, with or without recognition from Johnston. According to Johnston, Wiese offered his concessions to the Central African and Zoutpansberg Exploration Company, with which the naval explorer Cameron was connected. In August 1892 Wiese told Johnston that he was no longer personally interested in the fate of the concessions. According to a Foreign Office minute, Wiese offered the concessions to the B.S.A. Company for a small sum in January 1893. The search for financial support ended on 18 February 1893 when the Mozambique Gold Land and Concessions Company Limited was incorporated in London to operate Wiese's concessions, for which they paid him £1,500.[37]

The Mozambique Company approached the Foreign Office and were instructed first to register their concessions in Nyasaland. According to Johnston, early in 1893 Bowler sent copies of the concessions to Johnston, who replied that he must produce the originals or certified copies. In April and May 1893 there was an exchange of letters between Wiese and Johnston about the recognition of the concessions, and in the autumn Bowler wrote again on the matter. However, according to Johnston, between June and October 1891 the African Lakes and British South Africa companies had placed claims before his Land Court for recognition in the prescribed manner and no counter-claims were registered there.[38] Therefore, on 25 September 1893 Johnston granted a certificate of claim to the B.S.A. Company, in its commercial capacity, entitling them to exercise mining and other rights throughout the greater part of what was to become North-Eastern Rhodesia and including the whole of Mpezeni's country outside Nyasaland.

[36] 39; 42; 46, fo. 7; 47, fo. 36; 48; 49; 51; 52; 64, fo. 85-6.

[37] 67, fo. 140; 81, fo. 145; 64, fo. 89 (minute); 230, p. 69; *Maugham report*, p. 6.

[38] 80; 81, fo. 144, 146; 82.

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175 139 648 The B.S.A. Company produced in its support treaties made by Sharpe and Stevenson with six chiefs, Mpezeni not among them. Johnston's argument for including Mpezeni's country within the area of the grant appears to have been that the land had been wrested by Mpezeni from the treaty-making chiefs. None of the six chiefs mentioned by name in the certificate made any claim in the treaties to rights in Mpezeni's country, and indeed only one of them, Muliro, a minor Nsenga-Ambo chief, bordered on Mpezeni.

However Johnston also refers in the certificate of claim to 'similar privileges obtained through treaties concluded by the African Lakes Company and transferred by them to the British South Africa Company (the said treaties have received separate confirmation at my hands)'. These additional treaties are not specified in the certificate but later Johnston wrote, in connexion with the North Charterland Concession granted by the B.S.A. Company, that 'the B.S.A. Company would base its right to grant this concession on its recognized treaties with Undi, Mwasi Kazungu and ... (I forget the names), the indigenous and partially dispossessed chiefs of Mpezeni's country'. Sharpe had made a treaty with Undi 131 on 15 April 1891, in which the northern boundary of Undi's 175 territory was said to be the parallel of latitude 14° S. or thereabouts, 439 thus cutting into the southern fringe of the no-man's-land round 648 Mpezeni. Mwase made two treaties, one on 17 September 1885 with Stevenson as agent of the African Lakes Company and another on 30 November 1889 with the British Crown. In the earlier treaty the extent of Mwase's country is not stated but when the benefits of this treaty were transferred to the B.S.A. Company in 1893, Mwase's country was said to be bounded on the west by the water-parting between the Luangwa and Zambezi-Nyasa basins and on the south by the Anglo-Portuguese border. This water-parting does not meet the Anglo-Portuguese frontier until as far west as about 31° 15′ E., in what is now Petauke District, and in Ngoniland it runs approximately east-west on latitude 13° 49′ S. In the area controlled by Mpezeni, Mwase's territory, as defined in the transfer agreement, included the whole portion claimed by Undi in 1891 and in addition a strip of land to the north of Undi's claim, forming the southern margin of the Ngoni settled area. The main concentration of Ngoni villages, in the valleys of the Lutembwe, Lunthwele and Msipazi rivers, lay just north of the territory 175 claimed for Mwase. Thus the grant of rights to the B.S.A. Company 439 in Mpezeni's country appears to have been based for the most 648 part on treaties made with chiefs whose names Johnston forgot,

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and possibly also on the 1889 treaty between Mwase and the British Crown.[39]

Johnston granted a second certificate of claim, completed on 28 September 1893, to the African Lakes and B.S.A. companies jointly, based on the 1891 treaty with Undi and on another made a week later with a neighbouring chief. The area mentioned in this certificate conforms to that laid down in the treaty.[40]

Therefore when Warton arrived in Nyasaland in 1894 as emissary of the Mozambique Company and tried to secure recognition of Wiese's concessions, he found that the area claimed by his company had already been granted to its rivals. He succeeded in registering the concessions but not in gaining recognition of their validity.

Johnston registered, but did not recognize, the Wiese concessions. On the other hand the concessions acquired by the B.S.A. Company, though registered and recognized by Johnston, were not yet confirmed by the Foreign Office. Johnston's conduct of the affair did not meet with approval from his superiors at home, who thought that Warton had been unfairly treated.[41] One consideration influencing the Foreign Office may have been Wiese's German nationality. There had been an Anglo-German Agreement in 1891[42] defining the spheres of influence of these two countries in central Africa, but Maugham suggests that the Foreign Office thought that Wiese, after offering his services to Portugal and Britain, might now turn to Germany who could then use his concessions as the basis of a claim to the territory. At the same time the Foreign Office thought it might be unwise to declare the concessions invalid, since they might sometime be acquired by the B.S.A. Company and be used to strengthen its hand. Wiese, who according to Johnston had run away from Germany to evade conscription, had nevertheless received the support of the German Minister in Lisbon in securing rights to extensive estates in Portuguese East Africa in lieu of the £2,000 he had been promised originally by the Portuguese Government. Johnston suspected Wiese of trying to introduce German methods on his estates and wrote that it would be 'awkward' if the land between Nyasaland and the coast were 'in the hands of a stronger Power than Portugal and one

[39] 73; 75, fo. 180-1; 76; 7, fo. 33; 158, p. 61. I am much indebted to Sir Dougal Malcolm and the British South Africa Company for permission to cite the 1885 treaty and the transfer agreement of 1893. Unfortunately I have been unable to trace the 1889 treaty.

[40] 74.

[41] 85.

[42] *A & P*, 1890, li, pp. 24-31.

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175 439 648 far less likely to yield its pretensions'. These considerations found expression in the agreement of 24 November 1894, allowing the B.S.A. Company to take over from Johnston the administration of its sphere north of the Zambezi. The Foreign Office stipulated that sanction for the treaties made by the B.S.A. Company's agents was to be without prejudice to Wiese's possible claims.[43]

The Mozambique Company opened negotiations with the B.S.A. Company with these registered but unrecognized concessions as their asset. Agreement was reached on 8 May 1895. In return for any rights they might have in the British sphere under Wiese's concessions, and conditional on their raising certain capital, the Mozambique Company were granted mineral and land rights in a block of land ten thousand square miles in extent within the B.S.A. Company's territory. The rights of Natives were to be respected. Any rights the Mozambique Company might have in Portuguese territory were not to be exercised. A new company, the North Charterland Exploration Company, in which the B.S.A. Company had an interest, was formed to operate the grant of land. Thus the North Charterland Concession came into being. The whole of Mpezeni's country, except for that portion included in the Nyasaland Protectorate, came within the Concession.[44]

Some thirty-five years later, Mr. Justice Maugham was to rule that this grant to the Mozambique Company could only have been potential, not actual, since at that time the B.S.A. Company did not yet possess the mineral and other rights they were making over. At the time this consideration carried no weight. In April 1895, even before agreement with the B.S.A. Company had been concluded, the Mozambique Company's pioneer party reached Tete. They arrived in Ngoniland in the following year.[45]

4. *European consolidation*

175 439 567 648 721 In Nyasaland fighting continued sporadically in an attempt to end the slave trade. From 1891 onwards Johnston's troops fought a series of engagements with Arabs, Yao and southern Ngoni. Mpezeni was regarded not only as a robber with whom no treaties were necessary but also as a partner in the slave trade, for one of the main routes used by Arabs and their African colleagues ran near Mpezeni's country.[46] All Ngoni raids were interpreted by the Nyasaland Administration as raids for slaves and Sharpe, describing his second visit to Mpezeni, wrote that the chief did a brisk

[43] 67, fo. 141-2; 95, p. 48.
[44] 99; 100.
[45] *Maugham report*, pp. 6-7.
[46] *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 3 (1 February 1896), p. 2, and iii, 8 (15 April 1896), p. 1.

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trade in slaves, selling them to the Arabs.[47] Wiese's evidence on this point is contradictory. In 1881 he wrote that Arab caravans continually visited Mpezeni and that most of the raids were to capture slaves for sale to the Arabs. In 1900, he wrote in one place that some captives were sold to the Arabs and in another that Mpezeni scarcely knew of the permanent slave hunters and that the sole object of major raids was to gain captives to cultivate the Ngoni fields.[48] Few tales of the Arabs and no nicknames have survived to the present time among the Ngoni, and it is probable that Sharpe was overestimating the importance to Mpezeni of the external slave trade. Although Livingstone knew it, Wiese and Kerr are the only contemporary writers who were aware that captives were assimilated,[49] for other writers do not distinguish between captives and slaves. Whether or not the raids were made for Ngoni recruits or for slaves to be sold to the Arabs, it is clear that they were often made into Nyasaland and thus challenged the Administration there. Towards the end of 1895 the Collector at Kotakota opened a campaign against Mwase Kasungu, the Cewa chief whose territory lay between Mpezeni and the Ngoni of northern Nyasaland. It is alleged that Mpezeni offered to help Mwase in this campaign, but it seems that no help arrived. On 31 December 1895 the fortified village of Kasungu was captured and Chabisa, a chief who had been helping Mwase, fled to Mpezeni.[51]

Chabisa may have been the moving spirit behind the delegation which early in 1896 went from Mpezeni to the Ngoni of northern Nyasaland calling on them to rise with him and Chabisa against the British.[52] The Livingstonia Mission had already been working among the northern Ngoni for eighteen years, and the delegation found little support.

As well as Chabisa, other refugees arrived from the south, after the First Matabele War of 1893 in Southern Rhodesia. According to some accounts the Ndebele Paramount Chief, Lobengula, was with them, only to die a few months later.[53]

[47] Sharpe, 'Lake Nyassa', p. 745. cf. Perham, *Ten Africans*, p. 96.
[48] Wiese, 'Expedição', p. 478 and 'Geschichte', pp. 188 and 197.
[49] Livingstone, *Narrative*, p. 385; Kerr, 'Upper Zambesi', p. 396.
[51] Swann, the Collector, in *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 4 (15 February 1896), p. 1; and *A & P*, 1896, lviii, pp. 417, 418, describes Chabisa and Mwase as Ngoni and Zulu chiefs. Money and Smith, 'Explorations', p. 168, say Mwase and Chabisa were brothers. It is unlikely that either was Ngoni. Johnston, *British Central Africa*, p. 144, calls Mwase a Cewa but says he had many Ngoni headmen under him, thereby amending his earlier statements that Mwase and Undi were Ngoni. See [illegible] 129; *A & P*, 1896, lviii, p. 412. [52] Elmslie, *Wild Ngoni*, p. 292.
[53] *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 10 (15 May 1896), p. 2; Lancaster, 'Tentative chronology', p. 83; Posselt, *Upengula*, pp. 112-24; 98; 121, fo. 193.

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Meanwhile there was a lull in European activity in Mpezeni's country itself. After Wiese and the Portuguese officer left in mid-1891 a Portuguese trader remained behind. He was subsequently killed, either by accident or on Mpezeni's instructions.[54] After sending envoys to Johnston on Lake Nyasa in January 1890 and reporting the death of the Portuguese trader, Mpezeni seems not to have made any attempts to get in touch with Europeans for some years. Johnston sent an influential Swahili headman to visit Mpezeni in 1891, but Mpezeni threatened to behead the messenger if he entered Ngoniland, and he turned back before reaching the country.[55] In 1892 Ngoni patrols sweeping to the south in Undi's country came in touch with a French explorer living there and some of them were killed by his men. In 1895 they made contact with him again and he visited a senior lieutenant of segment 4.[56]

But the Frenchman was a bird of passage. It was not until 5 December 1895 that prospectors arrived with the intention of remaining in the country. They represented the Rhodesia Concessions Company and began to build Fort Partridge at Mafuta's, only twenty miles to the north of Mpezeni.[57] In the face of Johnston's opposition they had been allowed to bring Maxim guns with them. Despite the threat to Mpezeni implicit in this, they were at first received hospitably. Later the Ngoni became less friendly towards them, due, they thought, to the arrival of Chabisa and the Ndebele refugees and also because of the news reaching Mpezeni of increasing British activity in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. In May 1896 the prospectors thought that they might all be massacred and appealed for help to Kotakota. Troops were moved up from the Lake to Kasungu but, as we have mentioned above, they withdrew when it was found that the prospectors were in no danger. Nevertheless the prospectors left Ngoniland on 13 June, not for fear of Mpezeni but because the North Charterland complained that they were poaching on its preserves.[58] Thus the control of Europeans in his country had already passed out of Mpezeni's hands.

There were a number of transient visitors to Mpezeni in 1896,[59] and the B.S.A. Company's representative paid a visit, but

[54] 67, fo. 140.
[55] 81, fo. 147-8.
[56] Foà, *Lac Nyassa*, p. 281, and *Big game*, pp. 84, 105. In another account, 'Traversée de l'Afrique', p. 113, Foà says he visited the lieutenant in 1892.
[57] See Map C.
[58] 97; 101, fo. 483; 102a, fo. 479; 113, fo. 41; 115, fo. 281; 125; 126; 148a, fo. 141; *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 10 (15 May 1896), p. 2, and iii, 11 (1 June 1896), p. 2; Money and Smith, 'Explorations', p. 168; Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 12.
[59] McClonnie, Smith and Fraser, reported in *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 10 (15 May 1896), p. 1, and iii, 13 (1 July 1896), p. 2.

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the most serious intrusion was from the direction of Tete. After his return to Africa in 1892, Wiese had occupied himself with his newly won estates in the Zambezi Valley, where his activities attracted the unfavourable attention of Johnston. His interests in Mpezeni's country took second place for a while, despite his letter to Johnston about them on 14 May 1893. It appears that when the Mozambique Company's party arrived at Tete in April 1895 they made contact with Wiese. Thereafter he was closely connected with the activities of the Mozambique Company and of its successor, the North Charterland. The exact course of events is not clear. Johnston reported on 24 March 1896 that Wiese had broken with the North Charterland, yet when Warton visited Mpezeni four months later as leader of the North Charterland delegation, Wiese was with him as interpreter.[60]

At the beginning of 1896 representatives of the North Charterland first arrived in Ngoni country. After a short time, one of them was expelled by Mpezeni. On 5 July 1896 Warton with the main party established the North Charterland headquarters at a camp, later known as Fort Young, in the heart of Ngoniland adjacent to Loangeni, headquarters of segment 10.[61]

At first Mpezeni treated the North Charterland party kindly and provided them with carriers to bring up their loads from Tete.[62] According to the Foreign Office, whose sources of information I cannot trace, Mpezeni was friendly because Wiese emphasized that he was a German and offered himself and the expedition as a bulwark against British expansion. Warton, the ex-secretary of a cricket team and sometime lieutenant-colonel, posed, it was said, as Wiese's elder brother.[63] These allegations were denied by Warton and Wiese. They pointed out that the first member of the North Charterland party to enter Ngoniland had been an Englishman and maintained that Mpezeni was too intelligent not to recognize for himself the difference between an Englishman and a German. Warton had been introduced by Wiese merely as *okullo-ango* [*mkulu wangu*, my superior]. They maintained that the British flag had always been flown with the North Charterland's own flag.[64] Warton and Wiese's testimony conflicts with the Ngoni recollection

[60] *Maugham report*, p. 7; 121, fo. 192; 163; 164; Poole, *Native tribes*, pp. 12*f*.

[61] 121, fo. 192; 163; Poole, *Native tribes*, pp. 12, 71. Deare, who never mentions Warton or Wiese by name, claims to have been first to build the fort. Deare, 'Slave raiders', 27 April.

[62] Forbes in *C.A.P.*, 15 November 1896; Warton in *African Review*, x, 216 (9 January 1897), p. 67; Deare, 'Slave raiders', 27 April; 148a, fo. 141.

[63] 160, p. 64; Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 12; Read, 'Tradition', p. 478.

[64] 163; 164.

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of these events, as recorded by Read, and with the contemporary account of Genthe. Genthe was a German traveller who always flew a British flag in central Africa. There was no flag at Warton's camp when he visited it in 1897 and the North Charterland asked him not to display his Union Jack. Whatever may really have happened, an explanation of the North Charterland's success by reference to its anti-British pose conflicts with the evidence of Mpezeni's missions of friendship to the Collector at Kotakota. Deare, one of the North Charterland party, gives the impression that the success of the expedition was due to his ability to speak Zulu, make the right presents, and diagnose the cause of illness in Mpezeni's cattle. This explanation seems just as likely.[65]

It seems probable that Mpezeni was prepared to be friendly with the British at a distance but did not want them on his doorstep. We have noted his deputation to Johnston in January 1890. Early in 1896 Mpezeni sent a mission to the Collector at Kotakota asking for a British flag. Surprisingly this overture seems not to have been followed up. Swann, the Collector, did, however, send twelve beasts as a present to Mpezeni who replied, after prompting from Swann, with a gift of ivory.[66] In September Mpezeni sent word to the Collector that he had punished his warriors who had attacked some B.S.A. Company's carriers. In October his envoys told the Collector that he did not allow raiding and that he was glad to hear of raiders being punished when they were caught, while in February 1897 he appealed through his messengers to the Administration for help in restraining his people from raiding inside Nyasaland.

Wiese accompanied Mpezeni's envoys on this last trip to Kotakota and according to a North Charterland account of their mission, Mpezeni then consented to the introduction of a British garrison in his territory.[67] Even towards Warringham, the B.S.A. Company's representative, he was friendly at first. In about June 1896 he exchanged presents with him and made many expressions of good will, though telling Warringham that he was not afraid to meet him in war if necessary.[68]

[65] Genthe, 'Mpezeni's', p. 1; 165; Deare, 'Slave raiders', 20, 27 April, 4 May.

[66] *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 4 (15 February 1896), p. 1, and iii, 8 (15 April 1896), p. 1; *A & P*, 1896, lviii, p. 427; Swann, *Slave hunters*, pp. 315-16.

[67] *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 12 (15 June 1896), p. 1; iii, 18 (1 October 1896), p. 2; iii, 22 (1 December 1896), p. 3; iv, 4 (1 March 1897), p. 3; and iv, 7 (15 April 1897), p. 1; 165.

[68] *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 15 (1 August 1896), p. 3; Money and Smith, 'Explorations', p. 168.

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5. *Friction*

On 14 May 1897 Mpezeni wrote to the Collector at Kotakota that he wished to move across the border into the Protectorate. He said, 'If you agree to my removing . . . I shall not raid anywhere.' He was prepared to pay tax if called upon to do so.[69] He may have been led to take this drastic step by his growing annoyance at the activities of Warton and the North Charterland party. In 1896 Warton had apparently enjoyed Mpezeni's approval but he soon began to displease him. Johnston, who had no high opinion of his fellow-men, described Warton as 'that not very capable or prudent man' and as 'not a bad man but not very trustworthy'. The North Charterland was a purely commercial company and Warton had no administrative powers. These were reserved under the charter to the B.S.A. Company and were exercised on its behalf by Johnston until 1 July 1895, when Forbes was appointed Administrator for the B.S.A. Company's sphere. As yet, however, in Johnston's view, the B.S.A. Company had no governing rights in Mpezeni's country, as neither Mpezeni, nor the chiefs he was held to have displaced, had ceded them.[70] Forbes's nearest representatives were Warringham and Middleton, who in March 1896 made a camp sixty miles to the north of Mpezeni in the country of Cinunda, a Cewa chief. Forbes visited Mpezeni in September 1896, but with no success.[71] Warton considered that in the absence of any action by the B.S.A. Company he must set up his own administration. He drew up elaborate plans for developing the country, calling for an armed police force and for a hut tax of 5s.[72] He believed, he said, that if Mpezeni were convinced that the North Charterland had sufficient force available, he would not resist them.[73] He may have been influenced in adopting this attitude by the remark he attributed to the chief that if he was seriously threatened by Europeans he would give way. This conflicts with Mpezeni's remark to Warringham that he was quite prepared to fight, which we have noted above. According to Johnston, Warton tried to force a flag on Mpezeni and to stop him raiding for slaves. Johnston seems not to have been impressed with the delegations to Kotakota and maintained that Mpezeni organized raids to spite Warton.[74]

[69] 167.

[70] 169, fo. 63; 172, fo. 161; 158, p. 63; *B.C.A.G.*, iv, 13 (1 August 1897), p. 2, cols. 1 and 3; *A & P.*, 1896, lviii, p. 425.

[71] Poole, *Native tribes*, pp. 12, 71; *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 19 (15 October 1896), p. 2.

[72] Poole, *Native tribes*, pp. 12-13.

[73] 122.

[74] 152, p. 59; 158, p. 62. [Text continues on page 85]

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MAP C. WHITE SETTLEMENTS IN NGONILAND 1890–1900

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

——— White territorial boundaries.

———·——·——· North Charterland Concession, northern boundary.

▪ White settlements, with date of foundation.

A Camp near Mlanda known in 1896 as FORT YOUNG.

B Brick building known from 1898 onwards as FORT YOUNG or FORT ETTAMBA.

FORT JAMESON. The name applied in 1896 to a camp at CHIWUMA'S; possibly in October 1897 to MAPUTA'S; from December 1897 until March 1898 to CHITUNDA'S; and from October 1898 onwards to the township founded at KAPATAMOYO'S.

FORT YOUNG. The name applied in 1896 to a camp (A) at Mlanda; in 1897 and 1898 to a camp, also known as WEBB'S or CHAKWANA, near the village of Loangeni; and from later in 1898 onwards to a brick building (B) about two miles farther west.

LOANGENI. Ngoni village, headquarters of segment 10.

CHITUNDA. Ngoni village, headquarters of segment 15, also known as MPEZENI'S.

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6. *Fighting*

The European travellers who came to Ngoniland did not come alone. They brought with them their own retinues of servants and carriers, usually not Ngoni, who took orders only from their own masters and over whose misdoings there was continual friction with the Ngoni.[75] Wiese had an armed guard of a hundred and twenty Makua, though later this was disbanded.[76] Mpezeni insisted that the so-called Fort Young should not have a stockade but only a low reed fence, presumably to prevent the North Charterland from putting themselves beyond the reach of his warriors.[77] On the other hand Warton and the North Charterland directors were insistent that their employees should be armed, sought permission from the Foreign Office to import arms through Nyasaland, and even threatened to withdraw if the B.S.A. Company did not make adequate arrangements for their protection. Johnston was firmly opposed to private armies and private wars, and the Foreign Office advocated that if the North Charterland was in a precarious position it should withdraw until an administration had been established. Eventually Johnston came round to the view that the B.S.A. Company was so committed in Southern Rhodesia that it could not provide the North Charterland with the protection it was entitled to, and that, therefore, the North Charterland had a reasonable claim to arms of its own. Accordingly in July 1896, he reluctantly approved the import of two Maxim guns 'for eventual use against Mpezeni'. These Maxims seem never to have arrived, but Deare successfully smuggled in thirty rifles.[78] Thus the stage was set for struggle by persuasion to give way to struggle by arms.

At the same time as they were thus altering the distribution of power within Ngoni country, the European intruders were developing external relations with other African groups which were incompatible with the raided-raiding relationship existing between them and the Ngoni. Wiese had trading-stations in other tribal areas,[79] and we have already noted his plans for building up a large trading business based on the labour of his wife's slaves. Genthe was friendly with Cewa and Kunda chiefs and on that account tried to represent their interests to Mpezeni after they had been raided.[80] Deare went to visit Cimwala and Undi, Cewa chiefs, in about January

[75] e.g. the affair of the stolen red blankets, described by Deare, 'Slave raiders', 4 May.
[76] Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 14.
[77] Deare, 'Slave raiders', 27 April.
[78] ibid., pp. 57-8; 129-33; 139-42; 149; 155; 156.
[79] ibid.
[80] *B.C.A.G.*, iv, 13 (1 August 1897), pp. 1-2.

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1897 and some time later they came to visit him at Fort Young. Deare gave them presents, presumably to gain their support for his own enterprises, and makes no mention of their seeing Mpezeni.[81] Undi was the chief who claimed part of Mpezeni's country in his treaty with Sharpe and who in 1892, when Foà was living in his village, was raided by Ngoni several times a month.[82] Thus the Europeans in Ngoniland were affiliated not only to European groups in Nyasaland and in England out of direct touch with Mpezeni but also with African groups with whom he was in contact. There was an essential contradiction in the situation in which, for example, Deare was friendly with both Mpezeni and Undi while Mpezeni was at war with Undi. Everywhere, not only in Nyasaland, the traditional Ngoni pattern of external relations was becoming incompatible with their relations with Europeans in their midst.

The leader of the opposition to the North Charterland was Nsingu, Mpezeni's heir.[83] Nsingu was at first friendly towards Warton but later his attitude changed. Deare, before establishing the North Charterland camp in 1896, had passed through Nsingu's village, by Ngoni standards an insulting thing to do, and later quarrelled with him, finally flogging him.[84] Genthe, the German traveller, met Nsingu on a path and only grudgingly gave way to let him pass.[85] While Mpezeni remained comparatively friendly, Nsingu and the warriors whose interests he came to represent became increasingly hostile towards all Europeans. At the same time Mpezeni's control over his lieutenants seems not to have been effective, as evidenced by his apparent inability to prevent unauthorized raiding. Deare, according to his own account, enjoyed Mpezeni's favour and was almost forced to marry one of his daughters, and yet Mashanga, the second lieutenant of segment 10, twice tried to kill him.[86] According to Genthe, Mpezeni sent repeatedly for some army leaders who had been raiding and they failed to appear. This may have been deliberate procrastination arranged by Mpezeni, who treated him coldly, but Genthe thought that Mpezeni was only a dummy whose lieutenants did what they liked.[87] With Deare there seems to have been a genuine difference in attitude between Mashanga on the one side and on the other Mpezeni, supported by Mcekwani, the first lieutenant over

[81] Deare, 'Slave raiders', 4 May.
[82] Foà, *Lac Nyassa*, pp. 280-1.
[83] Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 13.
[84] Deare, 'Slave raiders', 27 April.
[85] *B.C.A.G.*, iv, 13 (1 August 1897), p. 1.
[86] Deare, 'Slave raiders', 11 May. cf. Wiese, 'Expedição', p. 470.
[87] Genthe, 'Mpezeni's'.

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Mashanga. Swann appears to have believed Mpezeni sincerely wished to stop raiding into the Protectorate although his people continued to do so.[88]

The cleavage within the tribe between Chief and people was attributed by Wiese to the large number of captives who had been incorporated.[89] We may well ask whether there had not always been considerable fluidity in the distribution of power among the different branches of the royal house and their supporters. After the death of Zwangendaba there was factional fighting, and at least once on the march north, about 1840, there was a purge in which the original members of the tribe, presumably Ndandwe by origin, killed off many of the more recently incorporated Tsonga who had been promoted at their expense.[90] These struggles show clearly that the formal arrangement of segments within the residential system did not preclude struggles for power within that system. The decline in power of Mpezeni and the rise of his heir must indeed be seen as part of the normal operation of the system rather than the result of manipulation or of unusual external conditions.

Wiese anticipated that there would be fighting on the death of Mpezeni.[91] Some idea of the way in which the fight would have gone in the new circumstances of European contact is given by Wiese's statement, in 1891, that Nzermane would not submit to Nsingu on Mpezeni's death and that he would be the best successor as far as the interests of Portugal were concerned.[92] Later, Deare remarked that the 'king had two other sons, younger than Tsinko, named Zamane and Madzimai, whom I never saw, but I learnt much about them and had fixed my eye on the former for the succession if anything happened'.[93] When British troops had already begun their advance on Ngoni, Manning, their commander, hoped that the tribe would split into factions, some of which would side with him.[94]

Fighting between rival claimants for the throne was likely even without external backing for one candidate. We have only to turn to Zululand for an analogous situation in which there was fighting

[88] Swann's report for 1896, *B.C.A.G.*, iv, 7 (15 April 1897), p. 1.
[89] Wiese, 'Geschichte', p. 187.
[90] See p. 19. Elmslie, *Wild Ngoni*, p. 24; Chibambo, *My Ngoni*, p. 23; cf. Young, *History*, p. 112, who reverses the role played by witch-finders in this incident.
[91] As reported by Warton in June 1896, cited by Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 13.
[92] Wiese, 'Expedição', p. 493.
[93] Deare, 'Slave raiders', 11 May. In modern spelling, Nsingu, Nzermane, and Madzimawi.
[94] 1881, fo. 39.

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between rival heirs even while the occupant of the throne was still alive. The brothers Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi fought for the heirship while their father Mpande was still chief.[86]

The apparent ineffectiveness of Mpezeni's rule may well have been due to the increasing segmentation of the State as it expanded and to the growing differentiation of interest between one major segment and another. As it happened, there was no civil war and the tribe did not split, at least not in these terms. A cleavage in the royal house did reveal itself later, in 1903, after British rule had begun, when Madzimawi tried to take the name of Zwangendaba and was opposed by the supporters of Mpezeni II, son of Nsingu. But by then the form of the State was already determined by political forces other than the balanced opposition of segments. It is significant of the changed situation that Madzimawi did not send his armed followers against the new Mpezeni to challenge his succession. Instead he applied to the Native Commissioner for permission to take the name of his grandfather.[88]

Instead of dividing in civil war the whole country united against the European interlopers. Mpezeni alone tried to protect his friend Wiese. The effective cleavage was not between rival heirs but between the Paramount Chief and his people. He was now a man in his sixties who seemed not to want war and who perhaps benefited more than his people from the presents made by Europeans. The Ngoni people continued to believe and teach that fighting was the proper occupation for men. An attempt to exploit this cleavage was made in 1897 when Wiese, perhaps remembering his earlier attempt to serve Portugal and Britain simultaneously, offered his services to the B.S.A. Company. Forbes thought that if Wiese was given troops, he would be supported by Mpezeni, who would then be in a position to hold Nsingu and the Ngoni warriors in check.[89] But this plan was overtaken by events.

We saw in the previous chapter that the organization of the State was based on warfare, not only on war as an activity bringing prestige to successful warriors but also on war as a method of recruitment to the ever-widening segments of the residential system. Without warfare to eliminate the unsuccessful and to bring promotion and dependants to those who survived, the system could not keep going. It was in no sense inevitable that the Fort Jameson Ngoni and the British should fight; we have only to turn to the

[86] Gluckman, 'Kingdom of the Zulu', pp. 35-6, and *Malinowski's Sociological Theories*, pp. 19-20; Krige, *Social system of the Zulu*, p. 19.
[88] See pp. 139 *f.*
[89] Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 14.

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Ngoni of northern Nyasaland for a similar situation which ended in the relatively peaceful incorporation of the tribe into the framework of colonial administration. But in northern Nyasaland there were no gold-mines, there were only missionaries. Johnston admits that the presence of mission stations among the northern Nyasaland Ngoni embarrassed him, and he refrained from using force against them in 1895 because this might have interfered with missionary activity.[99] In Mpezeni's country there were no mission stations and, as it happened, no gold-mines worth worrying about either; but by the time this fact had been realized it had ceased to be significant for the Ngoni. The North Charterland was formed in the belief that Mpezeni's country was rich. The capital of the company, not all paid up, was £1,000,000 and in 1897 it offered a reward of £10,000 to the discoverer of the first payable gold-field in its concession.[100] Given the fact that wealth of this magnitude was at stake, that there was gold to be found, and given the tactlessness of Warton and the intransigence of Nsingu, it was likely that war would come sooner or later.

As it was, the end of the Ngoni State as a sovereign political unit and its incorporation within a colonial empire came suddenly. Instead of the gradual formation of new groupings and alignments, the new system began as suddenly as the old system ended. We tend to think of the arrival of Europeans in the backwoods of Africa as a gradual process extending through many decades, and indeed even in Ngoniland there were Europeans for at least thirteen years prior to the war. Yet to old Ngoni of to-day the coming of the Europeans is a precisely defined event which took place on 19 January 1898.

The sequence of events which culminated in the fighting was as follows. In May 1897 some of Mpezeni's people began to build shelters and clear gardens at the headwaters of the River Bua, just inside the Nyasaland Protectorate. Sharpe, who had succeeded Johnston as Commissioner, was at first not greatly pleased, but instructed the Collector at Kotakota to make clear to Mpezeni that he would have to conform to the wishes of the Administration. A peaceful settlement between Mpezeni and the British seemed possible, and on second thoughts Sharpe was pleased to see, as he thought, Mpezeni removed from the sphere of influence of the North Charterland and the B.S.A. Company, who might have taken action against him and precipitated a crisis. However, the Collector was single-handed and it seems that he was unable to

[99] *A & P*, 1896, lviii, p. 437.
[100] *African Review*, xiii, 254 (2 October 1897), p. 24.

1:Barnes E-5 (1946-1949)1954 FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

visit Mpezeni to arrange a peaceful settlement with him.[181] In any case, although some movement of population may well have taken place, Mpezeni and the greater part of his people remained outside the Protectorate and in the Concession. In October 1897 Warringham, the B.S.A. Company's Collector at Cinunda's, moved in closer to Ngoniland and occupied the abandoned Fort Partridge, twenty miles north of Mpezeni. A month or so later, he appears to have found it prudent to move back again to Cinunda's.[182]

In December Manning, acting as Commissioner while Sharpe was on leave, was told by a North Charterland official at Chikwakwa, on the Shire, that Mpezeni's warriors were said to have murdered two Europeans on their way from Tete. This report was not confirmed. On 28 December[183] news arrived from Warringham that he at Cinunda's and Wiese at Fort Young were in danger of attack and could not communicate with each other. On 4 January there was news that Wiese was safe. According to his own account, Wiese was secretly warned by Mpezeni of the planned attack on him and had time 'on the next dark night' to build a small fortification into which he retired.[184] However, Wiese and his two European companions thought themselves still in danger and on 9 January wrote to the North Charterland general manager and to Warringham at Cinunda's asking for help and arms.[185]

Meanwhile a force of about seven hundred troops was organized by Manning in Nyasaland. Warringham at Cinunda's was reinforced but on 9 January he reported that Ngoni raids were preventing him from collecting provisions. The next day there was news that Wiese, now with three other Europeans, was still surrounded at Fort Young and that the Ngoni had mustered fully forty thousand fighting men. The rear troops, whose progress

[181] 272, fo. 61; 278, fo. 172; 273.

[182] Poole implies, but does not specifically mention, the move back to Cinunda's. In 1897 Genthe referred to the Cinunda camp as Fort Jameson and according to Poole this name was transferred to Fort Partridge when Warringham moved there. If so, the name must have been transferred back again with Warringham, for the Fort Jameson mentioned in reports of the fighting, both by Poole and in *B.C.A.G.* and dispatches, is the Cinunda camp. On the other hand, the new Fort Jameson established at Kapatamoyo's after the war is said to have been some twenty miles south of the earlier station of the same name. cf. *B.C.A.G.*, iv, 13 (1 August 1897), p. 1; *Reports on the Administration*, 1898-1900, p. 71; Poole, *Native tribes*, pp. 12, 14-15, 19. The name Fort Young was also moved about, being at first applied to a camp near Missale. cf. *C.A.P.*, 15 November 1896, p. 5, and 1 December 1896, p. 3.

[183] Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 13, says this message reached Kotakota on 21 December. This seems unlikely, for Manning states that he received the news at Zomba by wire from Kotakota on the morning of 28 December. cf. 274; 275, fo. 376; *B.C.A.G.*, v, 1 (15 January 1898), p. 1.

[184] Wiese, 'Geschichte', pp. 186*ff*.

[185] 277-80.

1:Barnes E-5 (1946-1949) 1954 FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

towards Ngoniland had been halted after the report of 4 January, resumed their march.

Four companies under Captain Brake reached Cinunda's on 17 January and left the next day for Fort Partridge, which was burnt by Ngoni as they arrived. On 19 January they moved on towards Fort Young. After some skirmishing they arrived there at 5.20 p.m. and relieved Wiese and his companions. Fort Young was only a few hundred yards outside Loangeni, headquarters of segment 10, and in the morning Brake found that this village and others near by, including Nsingu's, were full of warriors. Accordingly he decided not to withdraw to Fort Partridge as he had intended and sent his troops to clear the villages and burn them down. Later in the day there was organized fighting but in the face of fire from seven-pounders and Maxims the Ngoni lost heavily. The number of Ngoni warriors involved was estimated at from 4,000 to 5,000.[186]

On the next day, 21 January, Mpezeni sent messengers to Captain Brake with a present of a sheep. Brake regarded this poor present as an insult and insisted that he would negotiate only with important lieutenants. The next day, five messengers arrived with twelve head of cattle, but Brake regarded the messengers as slaves and said that if a lieutenant did not come the next day, he would deal with Cimpinga, headquarters of segment 15 where Mpezeni was living, as he had dealt with Nsingu's village. On 23 January a lieutenant and an important man arrived to see Brake and were interviewed by him the next day. They stated that Mpezeni was weary of the war brought on by the misconduct of his sons, and that he placed himself in Brake's hands to impose what conditions of peace he might choose. When Brake arrived at Cimpinga on 25 January he was met by two men who said that Mpezeni had gone into hiding outside the village. Brake told them to tell Mpezeni to come, otherwise the village would be destroyed. Brake waited until 5 p.m. and then burnt the village except for Mpezeni's own hut and those of his wives. The next day Lt. Sharp, with five men, succeeded in encountering Mpezeni, who had fifty men with him. Mpezeni asked for twenty minutes' grace while his wives got away and managed to slip away himself.

The main body of troops under Manning arrived at Cimpinga on 28 January. Manning sent out messengers to inform the Ngoni that unless Nsingu was handed over by the night of 30 January, troops would 'penetrate to every valley in Mpezeni's country and punish every village where opposition was encountered'. Manning

[186] cf. Read, 'Tradition', p. 475; Bradley, *Northern Rhodesia*, pp. 44-5.

1:Barnes E-5 (1946-1949)1954 FR5 Ngoni FR5
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received defiant answers to his messages and on 31 January dispatched four columns each of about two hundred men to sweep the eastern portion of the country. On 3 February Nsingu was surrounded by troops and surrendered to them. Manning tried Nsingu by court martial for murder, instigating to murder and raiding in British territory. He was found guilty and shot on 4 February in the presence of all captured lieutenants. On 5 February another column visited the southern portion of the country. Manning left the country the next day. He recommended, possibly on Deare's advice, that Mpezeni should be allowed to return as chief.

Mpezeni voluntarily surrendered to Brake on 9 February and was told he would be allowed to resettle and that his people could reoccupy their villages. A great number of these must, however, have been burnt by the troops, for even on 23 January Brake had reported that in one district there was hardly a village or hut left standing. More villages had been destroyed by the columns sent out by Manning.[107]

After Mpezeni's surrender, Brake continued trying to capture other important people thought to have been supporters of Nsingu, but it seems no more villages were burnt. Some leaders went into hiding, other like Madzimawi fled west to Nsenga country, while Mlonyeni, head of segment 6, went to Mwambera's country in northern Nyasaland. Mpezeni had at first been instructed to live in a village near his former home at Cimpinga, but was later moved to an Ngoni village near Fort Manning, which Brake was then building just inside the Nyasaland border. After a year he was allowed to return to the centre of his country and was reinstated as chief. He died from natural causes soon afterwards on 21 September 1900.[108] The leaders who had fled drifted back and no further action was taken against them. Some people began to cultivate their gardens again and to make shelters.[109] Others, particularly Cewa who had been captured only a short while before 1898, left Ngoniland and either returned to their former tribal areas or moved on elsewhere.

Although fighting between Ngoni and British ceased, there was still some scrapping between the North Charterland and the

[107] For the preceding paragraphs, see 176, fo. 372-4; 181; 184-90; 193-5; 198; *B.C.A.G.*, v, 1-3 (15 January, 5 and 26 February 1898), p. 1 of each issue; Poole, *Native tribes*, pp. 14-16, 71; Baxter, 'Angoni rebellion', p. 17 (map); Deare, 'Slave raiders', 11 May.

[108] *B.C.A.G.*, 118, vii, 9 (30 September 1900), p. 3. In view of this newspaper report the statement that Mpezeni died in October, made in *Reports on the Administration* 31 March 1902 and followed by Poole and others, must be wrong.

[109] 202; Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 16; Duff, *Nyasaland*, p. 42; Stigand, 'Natives of Nyasaland', p. 126.

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Mpezeni

B.S.A. Company's administration which now began to operate in Mpezeni's country itself. Each had its own African police force and on one occasion two people who had been taken prisoner by the Administration's police were released by a party of North Charterland police. The North Charterland police then arrested the Administration's police, and it was necessary for troops to come from Nyasaland to release them and arrest the North Charterland men.[110] By the end of 1899, however, conditions had become more settled. The B.S.A. Administration had acquired effective control over the whole of Mpezeni's country outside Nyasaland.

The military operations in December 1897 and in 1898 were carried out during the wet season and in consequence there was much sickness among the troops. Although it was not the time of year which the Europeans would have chosen for a campaign, according to one of my informants Warringham had been advised by an Ngoni man whose support he had gained that he should arrange for the war to take place while all the warriors were away from the immediate vicinity of Fort Young attending the national first fruits ceremony at the headquarters of segment 4, the village of Zwangendaba's great wife. The descendants of this man are still regarded as traitors by other Ngoni. The first fruits ceremony was usually held about the new year, so that the war may in fact have followed immediately after the ceremony. This view is supported by the remark made by Harding, who arrived in Ngoniland a few months after the war was over. He said that the war 'arose over a highly strung official [presumably Warringham] mistaking an ordinary Native dance for an act of hostility towards the Administration'.[111] Whatever the truth in the matter, the first fruits ceremony would have been an appropriate time for Nsingu to call for an attack on the Whites.

7. *Cattle*

It has been estimated that before the war there were about 20,000 head of cattle in Mpezeni's country.[112] During the fighting many were taken from Ngoni by Protectorate troops. These animals became the subject of much recrimination. Read states that half the cattle of the Ngoni were taken as 'rightful loot', while Poole states that a large portion of the 14,000 head captured were ultimately restored to their Ngoni owners.[113]

[110] 223, fo. 368.
[111] Harding, *Far Bugles*, p. 82.
[112] 238, p. 69 has 24,000, while *Report on the Administration*, 1903, p. 19, has 15,000-20,000.
[113] Read, 'Tradition', p. 478; Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 16.

1:Barnes E-5 (1946-1949)1954 FR5 Ngoni FR5
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Apart from the fact that the head of the segment is, or once was, a member of the royal lineage, there is little difference between a cadet segment and a commoner one. The majority of segments in the system as a whole have been founded by commoners and the majority of extant villages are the headquarters of commoner segments. Before the conquest, one of the principal mechanisms for ensuring the spatial dispersal of an expanding population was the formation of new large villages, the headquarters of segments formed for bevies of queens. After the conquest a comparatively stationary population has dispersed not under the leadership of queens but by the formation of new segments by commoners, not all of them even lieutenants of their lords.

Some indication of the distribution of present-day villages among these various types is given in Table VII. This table is based on 82 village histories collected in the general course of fieldwork. The villages were selected casually and arbitrarily, without reference to this particular problem. I also collected the histories of several counties, in the course of which I became acquainted with other village histories. I have excluded these from the sample to avoid weighing it too heavily with capital and chief's villages, whose names are mentioned in county histories. In consequence, the sample contains no chief's village at all. It also contains too few villages that have come into Ngoniland from other tribal areas, as can be seen by comparing it with Table IV (p. 118). Nevertheless it should serve to show the rough orders of magnitude.

It will be seen that about four out of five at the present time are commoner villages, and that about half of these were already in existence as distinct villages in 1898. On the other hand, seven out of the nine royal villages in the sample were founded before 1898.

Apart from the six incoming villages and the two founded by a labour immigrant and Administrative action, all the villages in the sample have some segment of the old residential system, or its modern equivalent, as their core. Most of the commoner villages have been formed by the differentiation of a quasi-relative, cognatic or affinal relative from his lord. By contrast, most royal villages have been formed by differentiation between bevies of co-wives or between sons and their fathers.

In pre-conquest times there was a dogma that the chief owned all the cattle in the tribe. This dogma related to the structural position of the chief as head of the highest segment, and therefore in authority over the State and its resources rather than to the day-to-day care and disposal of cattle. There were cattle in each village

1:Barnes E-5 (1946-1949) 1954 FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

and village headmen looked after them. About half the cattle in Ngoniland were captured during the fighting of 1898 and although many of these were returned to the Ngoni, they were soon disposed of to White traders. To-day, many of the cattle in royal (i.e. capital, regal and chief's) villages are said to belong to the Paramount Chief. This statement of royal ownership is now not merely one referring to political overlordship, for these beasts are contrasted with others which belong to commoners and to other chiefs

TABLE VII. VILLAGES FOUNDED BEFORE AND AFTER 1898

How founded or incorporated in the Ngoni State	*Type of present-day village*					
	Royal			*Cadet*	*Commoner*	*Total*
	Capital	*Regal*	*Chief's*			
Founded by regional governors or their ancestors prior to creation of the Ngoni State	0	0	0	0	3	3
Founded before 1898 to accommodate other segments of the residential system	1	6	0	1	25	33
Total known to have been founded before 1898	1	6	0	1	28	36
Founded to accommodate segments of the residential system, date unknown	0	0	0	1	11	12
Founded after 1898 to accommodate segments of the residential system or their modern equivalents	0	2	0	4	20	26
Founded outside the Ngoni State, date unknown, entering it after 1898	0	0	0	0	6	6
Founded in Ngoniland by a labour immigrant after 1898	0	0	0	0	1	1
Founded by direct Administrative action after 1898	0	0	0	0	1	1
Total known to have been founded or incorporated after 1898	0	2	0	4	28	34
Grand total	1	8	0	6	67	82

Sample collected casually in the general course of fieldwork.

1:Barnes E-5 (1946-1949)1954 FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

and members of the royal lineage. Nevertheless, the care and disposal of these royal cattle is the responsibility of the head of each village where they are kept. If the Paramount Chief visits the village, and a beast is killed in his honour, it is the Paramount Chief who is praised as the owner of the beast. The nearer the village concerned to the Paramount Chief, geographically, in terms of segments, and in terms of counties, the more the man in charge of the cattle should refer to the Paramount Chief before killing one of them, or to report a loss by leopards or hyenas. A few years ago the son of the first lieutenant in a regal village in the Paramount Chief's county removed some royal cattle to another tribal area where he had kinsmen. When this was discovered the matter was discussed by the senior lieutenants of the Paramount Chief's county at his village, and the lieutenant and his son were ordered to be banished. A new man was made first lieutenant in the regal village. In this instance, the lieutenant showed plainly that he was not using the cattle in the interests of the chieftainship. Had his village been farther away from the Paramount Chief, or had his use of the cattle been less obviously merely to his own advantage, it is unlikely that such severe reprisals would have been taken.

These cattle do still provide a visible sign of the connexion between the headquarters of the various segments and the Paramount Chief, and they still provide the first lieutenants of the royal village with wealth which they can use at their discretion to further the interests of the chieftainship. The structural relationship between the Paramount Chief and his subordinates in the old segmentary system is still partly mediated through cattle.

In the old residential system each segment, however small, contained within itself the seeds of an independent State, for there was no inherent restriction on its growth. When the imposition of British rule modified this system, the effect of the ossification of the system at the top was to prevent further splits in the State. The relationship between the major segments which became counties was defined, or rather was redefined, in perpetuity within the bounds of a single Superior Native Authority. However, below the level of these segments no such process of definition took place. A county, in Administrative terms, consisted of so many villages, not of a system of nesting segments. The Administration did not perpetuate these lesser segments by adapting them to its own scheme, and inter-village and intra-county relations were largely left to find their own configuration. This has had three distinct results.

Firstly, present relations between pairs of villages are still formulated in traditional terms and in part still arise as a result of

2: Read E-5 (1935-1939) 1956

FR5 Ngoni FR5

(a) 'Those from the south'

These were the descendants of the leaders of the two main Ngoni groups represented by the two Ngoni kingdoms, with their followers, who left Natal during the wars of Shaka. They were South-eastern Bantu of Nguni stock, and when they were first encountered by Europeans in Nyasaland, the Europeans called them Zulus and spoke of their language as Zulu. Ngoni informants in the 1930's who were regarded as most reliable repudiated their relationship with the Zulu, and always referred to their ethnic origin as a people of Swazi stock. Y. M. Cibambo whose knowledge of Ngoni traditions was unrivalled, said in his book *My Ngoni of Nyasaland*—'Very many of them [the Ngoni] came from Swaziland, which is north of Zululand'.[1] A nostalgic refrain occurred in more than one of their traditional songs:

Come let us go to Swaziland
Where the people die fat.[2]

Cultural affinities between the Ngoni in Nyasaland and the people now living in Swaziland and, to a lesser degree, with the Zulu, will be examined in several chapters of this book. In the chapter on clan descent names in Part III, we shall compare the clan names called Swazi by the Ngoni with the lists of clan names given by Bryant in *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal* [3] and with the list given by Kuper, in *An African Aristocracy*,[4] of the Swazi and pre-Swazi clans. The military organization of the Ngoni, the age-set system which formed part of it, and other cultural features which will be discussed in Chapter III of this section, all show a general cultural affinity with the peoples of the northern Nguni group of the South-eastern Bantu.

The separation of the Ngoni group from the parent stock, which took place at about the same time as the Ndebele and the Shangaan groups fought their way north, occurred before the Swazi and Zulu kingdoms took final form. It is more correct, therefore, to say that Ngoni cultural affinities were with the northern Nguni group as a whole than to say they were off-shoots of either the Zulu or the Swazi. The Ngoni themselves used the designation 'Swazi' for the people with clan descent names whose ancestors left the south with the original party. Some of the older men remembered their fathers and grandfathers speaking of their clan as having belonged to the Ntungwa group, the Mtetwa group, the Msane group, before the departure of the Ngoni took place. This differentiation into pre-Swazi tribal and clan groupings was not in the 1930's one to which the Ngoni gave much attention. In talking about their southern origin it was the Swazi connexion which they emphasized.

[1] Cibambo, Y. M. *My Ngoni of Nyasaland*. Lutterworth Press, 1942, p. 8.
[2] Read, M. 'Songs of the Ngoni People.' *Bantu Studies*, March 1937, p. 10.
[3] Bryant, A. T. *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*. Longmans, 1929, pp. 681–97.
[4] Kuper, H. *An African Aristocracy*. O.U.P., 1947, p. 233.

2: Read E-5 (1935-1939) 1956
FR5 Ngoni FR5

from the campaign and the purification of those who had killed any of the enemy.

Cibambo and other Ngoni informants had no idea of the size of the Ngoni armies beyond emphasizing that they were 'very big and very strong'. Evidence was forthcoming, however, from early European sources on the size of the armies which, though it can only have been based on guess-work, nevertheless gave an indication of the numbers involved. Dr. Elmslie referred in 1878 to having seen in the previous year an army of 10,000 of the northern Ngoni which went out in June and returned in September.[1] In the *B.C.A. Gazette* of December 1894, reference was made to the armies of the central Ngoni which were said to be, at the time of their last raids, 50,000 strong. In the *Blantyre District Note Book* there was an entry of 1884, giving no numbers for the army but reporting on the raid on Blantyre in that year when the 'vanguard of the army was composed entirely of young men in their first vigour of manhood, who were said to have marched 50 miles in half a day'. From such scanty references by Europeans, it is clear that the Ngoni armies in the field consisted of large numbers, were highly organized, and trained to feats of endurance as well as in fighting skill. The Blantyre reference also brought out the authority of the big war *induna*, who was presented with cloth by the Moir brothers of the African Lakes Corporation as a bribe not to attack the Blantyre area again, and kept his promise.

Objectives in warfare

Dr. Kuper wrote of the Swazi military kingdom that wars were waged 'to extend the boundaries, to retain tribal independence and to secure internal solidarity'.[2] After the Ngoni kingdoms were set up in Nyasaland, warfare had the same objectives with the additional one of bringing back captives and cattle. In north Nyasaland Dr. Elmslie, in the reference already cited, wrote that, after the four months' campaigning the Ngoni armies returned 'laden with spoil in slaves, cattle and ivory'. Up to the coming of the Europeans many of the raids and wars took place in the hope of annexing additional territory. Dr. Elmslie wrote in 1878 of the Ngoni dominating an area of 30,000 square miles in north Nyasaland from the lake-shore to the Luangwa river. In central Nyasaland the *B.C.A. Gazette* of 1894 reported that the Ngoni Paramount ruled from the Lintippe river near Lilongwe to the Luvubwe river south of the Kirk Range. The chief challenge to Ngoni security in the northern kingdom came from the Bemba, and in the central kingdom from a combination of Yao and Arabs. Dr. Laws recorded in 1886 that the Ngoni, in their final victorious campaign against the Bemba, had

[1] Elmslie, W. A. *Among the Wild Ngoni*. Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier, 1899, p. 79.
[2] Kuper, H. 'The Development of the Military Organisation in Swaziland.' *Africa*, Vol. X, No. 2, p. 176.

2: Read E-5 (1935-1939) 1956
FR5 Ngoni FR5

defeated an alliance between the Arabs and the Bemba in which the allies intended to dominate all the territory between the Luangwa river and the lake-shore, driving the Ngoni from their highlands and opening all the country to the slave-trade. In the central kingdom, during the interregnum after Cikusi's death in 1891, a powerful Yao chief raided the kingdom, destroyed six villages and took many captives. In both kingdoms it was necessary for the Ngoni to defend their independence by constant vigilance and preparedness, especially against a combination of Arab slave-raiders and local tribes. Since large numbers of warriors were mobilized every year, these trained armies demanded an outlet, and the policy of aggression served the dual purpose of raiding enemy territory and maintaining a defence force.

There was a difference of opinion among informants about the results of raids in terms of spoils of war. In both kingdoms captives were taken in war, especially young men of military age and women. From tsetse-free areas where cattle were to be found, live beasts were brought to add to the herds in the Paramount's village and in those of the chiefs and *alumuzana*. Ivory for trading and cloth for wearing were two of the most valued forms of booty, and Cibambo mentioned the looting of clothes and weapons from those who had been killed. From accounts by the first Europeans, it is clear that the Ngoni burned the villages and killed the inhabitants in the majority of their later raids.

If defensive and aggressive military action and the acquisition of valued forms of wealth were two of the main objectives in war, a third was undoubtedly the need to build up a national sentiment within the military kingdoms by success in warfare in the first place, and by intensive training of all young men in the second, thus integrating the youth from conquered units with those who belonged to the trans-Zambesi clans. Again and again, in talking about their past, Ngoni informants from the Paramounts downwards emphasized the discipline and training of the young men in the days of warfare, and expressed their opinion that no other training could take its place. It was not only the common military training which contributed to this national sentiment and held the Ngoni together in a common purpose of preparedness for warfare. The *libuto* or age set within the *libandla* or territorial unit, and the *impi* or national army in which the territorial units were merged, provided a military organization which was adaptable and balanced, and which, through the control of the Paramount, gave the main impetus to centralization, while encouraging pride and initiative among local and age-set groups.

The relics of a military tradition

In north Nyasaland the Ngoni never fought against the Europeans, and were not coerced into giving up warfare, but, as a result of their contacts with the Livingstonia Mission, they finally agreed to give it up voluntarily. When Dr. Laws met the Commissioner near Mponda's at

7: Hodgson G-5 (1926) 1933 FR5 Ngoni FR5 Maravi FR4

Livingstone found chief Mwase, at Kasungu, ruling over "a section of Mang'anja, called Machewa, or Macheba[1]."

For some years the Achewa enjoyed a peaceful existence in their new home, keeping cattle, but living mainly by agriculture, until their tranquility was disturbed by the Ngoni invasion and by the slave raids of the Jumbe[2] at Kota Kota. By these the eastern branch of Achewa was continually harassed; and consequently in 1893 Dzoole, Kanyenda and others of the house of Karonga moved south to the Kasangadzi and Mtiti Rivers, and in 1896 handed over this part of the country to the protection of the British Government.

The Angoni, under the name of Mazitu, were described by Livingstone as Zulus,[3] and this terminological error has been copied by more than one subsequent writer. Of their earlier wanderings no record has been traced. Owing, perhaps, to their lighter colour it has been surmised that they came from far up the east coast; but it is known that under the style of Abe-nguni, derived from an ancient chief Mnguni, they were settled on the Dedesi, a small tributary of the upper St. John's River, when the Aba-mbo first arrived in Natal about 1620.[4] In this locality they remained for a couple of centuries, till towards the end of his reign the notorious Zulu king Chaka fell upon their allies the Ama-ndwandwe under Zwide. A section of the Abe-nguni then migrated northwards under Zwangendaba; and wherever they went they fought and subdued the peoples through whose country they passed, seizing cattle and incorporating captives in their own tribe. After raiding the Aba-suto, Ama-swazi, Aba-thonga[5] and Ama-kalanga, they crossed the Zambezi near Zumbo at the time of the total eclipse of the sun on the 19th of November, 1835,[6] and overran the territories of the Aba-senga, A-tumbuka, A-safwa and A-mandewere till they came to the land of the Wa-fipa and Wa-sukuma.

Here Zwangendaba (or Songandawa, as he is generally called in Nyasaland) died, and his following broke up and scattered in different directions. While others advanced to the north and east, four sections turned back, one under Mombera to the Tumbuka country, another under Mpezeni to the Loangwa river, the third under Chiwere to Dowa, and the fourth under Chikusi still further south. It is with the third section that we are now dealing. The hybrid nature of the Dowa Angoni can be inferred from the list of clans given in a subsequent section (IV, 2). During the last four decades they have intermarried still further with the Achewa, and there are now few, if any, pure-blooded Angoni in the district. Their paramount chief, Chiwere, though calling himself an Mngoni, is in reality an Maenga.

The general features, characteristics and habits of these peoples are akin to those of neighbouring tribes which have been described by the Reverend Duff Macdonald,[7] Miss Alice Werner

[1] D. and C. Livingstone: *loc. cit.*, pp. 526, 548.

[2] A coast Arab, acting as *wali*, or representative, of the Sultan of Zanzibar.

[3] D. and C. Livingstone: *loc. cit.*, p. 381.

[4] Eric A. Walker: *Historical Atlas of South Africa*, p. 6. J. H. Soga: *The South-Eastern Bantu*, pp. 81, *et seq.*

[5] In ph and th each consonant is pronounced. Similarly, in ae and oo each vowel is pronounced.

[6] E. H. L. Poole: *Journal African Society*, vol. xxix, No. cxv, p. 290.

[7] Rev. Duff Macdonald, *Africana*. Miss Alice Werner, *The Natives of British Central Africa*. Dr. H. S. Stannus, *The Wayao of Nyasaland*, Harvard African Studies III, *Varia Africana* III, pp. 229-372, "Notes on Some Tribes of British Central Africa," *Journ. Roy. Anthrop. Inst.*, vol. xl. 1910, pp. 285-305, etc., etc.

8: Barnes E-5 (1946-1949) 1951 FR5 Ngoni FR5

The Fort Jameson Ngoni[3] are at this stage of transition. Many men and some women can read, if not write, and we can no longer call the tribe non-literate. Yet a society of this kind behaves in many ways as if it were non-literate. In particular, information about the past is transmitted orally and laws and customs are not committed to writing. In this paper I shall discuss some of the ways in which this information is manipulated. I shall distinguish between tales of fighting, relating to the period 1821–1898, which we may regard as tribal legends of origin; beliefs about customary behaviour relating to the same period; private legends which serve to explain the form of relations between present-day groups; and lastly history proper, documents describing contemporary events, if such exist.

Early travellers all speak of the various Ngoni groups as fierce warrior tribes interested only in destruction and plunder. With the spread of European control Ngoni raids ceased. Today in villages inhabited mainly by women and children, with scraggy animals and eroded gardens, the traveller looking for signs of a military tradition sees only khaki greatcoats and battle-dress. Among the Fort Jameson group, if not elsewhere, the great cowhide shields, and the regiments which carried them, have disappeared. Yet the battles of the past are still remembered and are called to mind in songs sung at drunken parties, in tales told to children and, importunately, to sympathetic strangers. Many of these songs are in the old Ngoni language now largely forgotten, and singers cannot give any precise meaning to the songs they sing. They are the relics of the past learnt parrot-fashion and in the context in which they are sung they do not require any specific reference. In our own culture we do not need to know who were the April rainers before we can sing "Green grow the rushes, O". Prose tales, however, are in ordinary speech and describe military exploits of people known to the speaker, or preparations for raiding ordered by the Paramount Chief and carried out by his lieutenants. The most frequently recounted battle of all is the fight between Ngoni and British troops in 1898. Many men and women are still alive who remember the fighting or even took part in it. The cataclysmic changes which followed the Ngoni defeat and the unusual weapons used combine to make the battle memorable. It is the only admitted defeat, for all other tales tell only of victory. The Ngoni defeated the Bemba, Wisa, Cewa, Kunda, and so on.

We know from contemporary travellers' accounts that though on the whole the Ngoni were successful against their neighbours, their run of successes was not unbroken. There is evidence that on occasion even the Cewa raided the Ngoni and took captives. We may regard the form taken by these legends as due in part to the process found in most cultures by which victories are remembered and defeats forgotten. But the distortion introduced is not only the elimination of defeat. The Administration and the Missions have,

3. I worked among these people during 1946–49 while on the staff of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.

8: Barnes E-5 (1946-1949) 1951 FR5 Ngoni FR5

quarrels in a village the headman is blamed by the chief for not controlling his people well. All disputes are best settled out of court, even if they must be referred to court later on. Therefore a quarrel in village A brings to light all the alliances and cleavages which link A with other villages and differentiate it from them. The headman of A appeals to B for support, invoking the historical incident linking them, and hopes to settle affairs of his village with the authority of B's approval behind him. For if the headman of B is a potential ally he is also a potential rival, and the dissident section in A may themselves invoke their link with B and transfer their allegiance to him. Thus although the details of the relationship between A and B, and the historical incident connected with it, may not be widely known there is considerable external pressure on them to maintain their relationship. Connexions of this kind, mainly between villages, but also between chiefdoms, play a large part in contemporary Ngoni life. Men walk twenty miles to a funeral and women carry pots of beer all day in response to ties of this kind.

Thus we see, on the one hand, that tribal legends are widely known, relate to pre-conquest times, and do not directly influence conduct; and, on the other, that legends associated with inter-group relations are known only by the groups concerned, may relate to either before or after 1898, and do directly influence action. Why is there this difference? We may regard the former legends as of significance mainly in external relations and the latter in internal. Within the tribe, and more particularly within the minor chiefdom, inter-group relations are still largely determined by Ngoni themselves, however much they may have altered in form and content since 1898 and however much Ngoni are part of a wide system. Movement between villages is only slightly controlled by the Administration and in quarrelling, in marriage and adultery, beer-drinking and hoeing, Ngoni men and women choose their own allies and enemies. Incidents in reality give rise to inter-group relations and are subsequently invoked to maintain them. History is written not in books but in the names of groups and in the remembered connexions between them, and as these connexions gradually change so local legendary history is gradually rewritten.

In external relations the Ngoni never act as a tribe except within the framework of European-controlled institutions. As yet no myth of origin is needed to explain the fact that Ngoni and Cewa representatives sit together on the Provincial Council save that the Administration put them there. The world of external relations is one of cultural heterogeneity and comparative adequate documentation. In this field legends have only a limited social function. They differentiate tribe X from tribe Y but do not relate them to each other.

Lastly we must consider Ngoni history proper. There have been many alleged accounts of Ngoni history published in Europe and South Africa, but these seem to have had little influence on the Fort Jameson Ngoni. Recently several histories have appeared in the vernacular, and tribal history

8: Barnes E-5 (1946-1949) 1951 FR5 Ngoni FR5

is now a subject taught in the primary schools. All these are based on the recollections of old Ngoni men and women more than on contemporary documents, of which there are very few. We must therefore regard them as written legends rather than proper histories. Differences between one version and another are sometimes related to the different political affiliations of these providing the information.[6] The period from 1821 to 1898 is treated in detail and the remaining fifty years dismissed in a few lines. It seems likely therefore that in time the tribal legend will be ossified, or that at least there will be one version widely known. Yet the vernacular texts are written in the school language (Nyanja) which is not yet the ordinary village speech (Nsenga), and are learned largely parrot-fashion, sometimes even with unintelligible words included. It remains to be seen how much of what is learnt under these conditions is carried over into life outside the classroom.

With the increasing documentation of modern life we might well hope that the period of legend alone will end and Ngoni history proper will begin. Unfortunately this is not so. Although it is fairly easy to find out from contemporary documents what went on in tribal affairs from 1890 to 1898, with the imposition of British rule a curtain descended. Official reports grow shorter and shorter with the years for there was less and less to record. Towards the end of the British South Africa Company's rule the published information on Ngoni life was little more than the annual statement, covering the whole of Northern Rhodesia, that "the conduct of the natives has been satisfactory". From the beginning of Colonial Office control in 1924 reports have lengthened, but these have dealt with the history not of the Ngoni tribe but of the Eastern Province and of Northern Rhodesia. These larger regions have become the significant units of government, not individual tribes and chiefdoms. The Fort Jameson Ngoni have become more and more closely integrated with the wider society and less and less have any history of their own. When the Ngoni were making history they lacked means to record it; now that means are available they have no history to record.

Thus we see that in this transitional society internal and external relations, as well as the level of technical skill, influence both the way in which people relate themselves to their past and also the timing and content of their written history.

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"A Durban Man" (Deare, Major George Russel). "Eighteen months with the last of the slave raiders." *Natal Weekend Advertiser*, 6 April–11 May 1929. (Page reference to typescript in Central African Archives.)

6. Read and Winterbottom have pointed out that informants from Northern Nyasaland assert that their Paramount Chief is the heir of Zwangondaba, while those from Fort Jameson say that their Chief is the heir. Cf. Read, *Tradition and Prestige*, p. 467, and Winterbottom, *Outline Histories*, p. 17.

9: Read E-5 (1935) 1936 FR5 Ngoni FR5

made friends with old Mpezeni and finally made Luangeni, Mpezeni's head village, his head-quarters. He obtained mining rights in the land from Mpezeni, by word of mouth, but Mpezeni signed no deed of gift or transfer. This legal point which subsequently became one of the major points at issue in the North Charterland Company case has been emphasized again and again to me in the villages. 'Mpezeni was writing nothing. He was only giving presents to Weise, and Weise gave presents to him, and Mpezeni was saying, "You may travel in my country and dig for gold. You are my friend."' They add further, 'Mpezeni did not want to make friends with the British because he had heard from the Matabele and from Nyasaland what they were doing. Weise said "I am not from the British", and so Mpezeni was making promises with him.' So deeply is this tradition of friendship between Mpezeni and Weise, with its consequences of betrayal and disaster, embedded in the Ngoni thinking, that when I stayed in the Paramount Chief's village and exchanged presents with him, many old people shook their heads and warned the young people, 'The *Azungu* war will come again. This is how that other war was beginning.'

Weise failed to establish his claim to mining rights in Mpezeni's territory with Sir Harry Johnston, then Commissioner for all British territories north of the Zambezi. Meantime the British South Africa Company obtained a new charter to extend its field north of the Zambezi, and sent an emissary to Mpezeni's kraal to make a treaty with him. Mpezeni refused. He also refused Sir Harry Johnston's emissary who met Weise at Mpezeni's kraal with a view to getting Mpezeni to make a treaty direct with the British Crown. The mining rights in Mpezeni's country were potentially valuable, and on Mpezeni's refusal to grant them were claimed by the British South Africa Company[1] on the ground of treaties made with the conquered Chewa people, whom Mpezeni had dispossessed.[2] Weise was at this time at Mpezeni's with one or two Portuguese traders and officials, making hay while the sun shone.

[1] 'Finding Mpezeni obdurate the British South Africa Company concluded treaties with all the surrounding indigenous chiefs whom Mpezeni had dispossessed. We consequently declined to acknowledge him as ruling chief.'

[2] F.O. 6537.

In 1895 the North Charterland Company was formed, distinct from and yet allied with the British South Africa Company,[1] with mining and trading rights over 10,000 square miles, most of which lay in Mpezeni's territory. The legal right to this concession was based on the British South Africa Company's treaties with 'dispossessed chiefs'. At the same time the North Charterland Company recognized that Mpezeni still held the effective sovereignty over the area, and that the success and safety of any mining or trading expedition sent to the territory depended on good relations being established with Mpezeni. They therefore persuaded Weise to join their staff in order to get Mpezeni's consent to the venture. They gained a foothold and did some prospecting, and then tried to impose a hut tax, and to exercise administrative powers through their own uniformed police of the Tonga tribe from Lake Nyasa—a tribe despised by the Ngoni. Two memoranda by Sir Harry Johnston to the Foreign Office set out the chain of events which led to the use of armed force against Mpezeni in January 1898, the pretext being the alleged danger of two white men in his country. Sir Harry Johnston wrote, 'Mpezeni is a very powerful Zulu chief and intimately allied with the Matabele. He offers no great objection to mining for gold but shows the greatest dislike to any interference with his independence or governing powers. The latter is the cause of his quarrel with Colonel Warton on the matter of a British flag and taxation.' He concludes the second memorandum with the remarks, 'Mpezeni is an intrusive Zulu robber who must sooner or later be dethroned and subdued. He is very powerful and is the only avowedly recalcitrant chief in all British Central Africa. When his hour comes he can be dealt with by the present Protectorate forces.' Following the last memoranda on the situation in Mpezeni's country the Foreign Office wrote to the British South Africa Company in April 1897, 'Lord Salisbury gathers that the North Charterland Company have maintained friendly relations with Mpezeni by withholding from his knowledge their connexion with the British South Africa Company and their British nationality. It is stated that the representative of the North Charterland Company has passed himself off to Mpezeni as brother to Weise.'

Lord Salisbury was well informed. When the Ngoni tell this story

[1] See North Charterland Inquiry.

9: Read E-5 (1935) 1936 FR5 Ngoni FR5

in the villages to-day, they do it by going over and over the events of those fateful years 1885–1898, from the first arrival of Weise up to the Ngoni war, in the vain hope of finding a satisfactory explanation of the connexion between Weise, the British South Africa Company, the North Charterland Company, and the British Crown. They give correct and precise details of the various Europeans who came to old Mpezeni's kraal seeking concessions, and finding the old chief adamant about signing away any concessions. 'Weise was his friend. Then came Weise's brother. He began to take money for our huts. Then Singu (Mpezeni's heir) became angry. Then they said, "We are Charterland" and Mpezeni refused: "I have given no promise to Charterland." Then came the *Azungu* war.'

I have given the foregoing events in detail because they are facts of history both to the Ngoni and the British, and necessary for understanding the present attitude of the Ngoni to white people. The Ngoni have given me their version again and again, always the same in substance, and always with the same emphasis, first on the refusal of Sir Harry Johnston and the British South Africa Company to recognize Mpezeni as the rightful chief in the land, and secondly on the treachery of Weise which delivered them into the hands of the North Charterland Company. Nor was the defeat in war their final humiliation. Singu, Mpezeni's heir, was taken and shot together with his wives; half the cattle of the Ngoni were taken as 'rightful loot'; and the North Charterland Company began assigning farms to Europeans in their tract. Six years later old Mpezeni died, leaving his grandson, a comparatively young boy, as his successor. On the old *indunas* and other sons of old Mpezeni fell the burden of guiding the young *inkosi* and carrying on the political and legal machinery subject to European administration.[1] At the same time fundamental economic changes were taking place. Settlers were arriving to acquire land and demand labour. The country was gradually parcelled out into European farms and native reserves, not without prolonged ill-feeling on both sides.[2] With the opportunity to work for wages came a demand for taxes to cover the costs of administration, and this demand in its turn made many men go out of the territory in search of better paid work in Southern Rhodesia and the Union.

[1] Under British South Africa Company till 1924.

[2] See North Charterland Inquiry.

10: Barnes E-5 (1946-1949) 1959
FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

THE FORT JAMESON NGONI

By J. A. BARNES

Historical and Ecological Background

101 THERE are about a dozen groups of peoples in different parts of Africa who call themselves Ngoni, and others not using that name have also been classified as Ngoni on the basis of common [131] origin. They are found in Tanganyika Territory, Portuguese East Africa, Nyasaland, and Northern Rhodesia. The name Ngoni is derived from Nguni, the designation applied to themselves by the Zulu and Xhosa peoples. The Ngoni have a common history of emigration from ●175 the vicinity of Zululand, in Natal, in the 1820's, and of subsequent 101 migration northwards. This common heritage they share with the Ndebele of Southern Rhodesia. These migrations were occasioned by the rise to power of the Zulu chief Shaka, whose defeat of his chief rival, Zwide of the Ndandwe, led to the flight northwards of parties of Ndandwe refugees. At least two parties travelled as far north as the River Zambezi, one of them led by Zwangendaba, whose party crossed the river in 1835.[1] This Ngoni group reached the vicinity of Lake Tanganyika in about 1845, and there Zwangendaba died. His people split into several segments, led by his sons and other followers. One of these segments went on farther north, others turned towards Lake Nyasa, while one segment led by Mpezeni, a son of Zwangendaba, struck south-westwards towards the Bemba country in what is now the Northern Province of Northern Rhodesia. Here, in about 1856, they fought unsuccessfully with the Bemba, retreated southwards, and in about 1865 crossed the River Luangwa into Fort Jameson District. In 1868 they moved westwards into Petauke District, and a few years later moved eastwards to their present habitat in the vicinity of Fort Jameson.[2] It is with this group of Ngoni that we are concerned.[3]

[1] Poole, *Date of the Crossing of the Zambesi*, pp. 290–2.

[2] Cf. Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*, pp. 459–70; Chibambo, *My Ngoni of Nyasaland*, pp. 1–36; Decle, *Three Years in Savage Africa*, p. 151; Elmslie, *Among the Wild Angoni*, p. 28; Fraser, *Winning a Primitive People*, pp. 312–15; Hodgson, *Notes on the Achewa and Angoni*, p. 123; Kapunzah, *Angoni, Unimba ndi Miyambi*, pp. 1–11; Lancaster, *Tentative Chronology*, p. 86; Poole, *Native Tribes*, pp. 5–10; Read, *Tradition and Prestige*, p. 464; Stigand, *Natives of Nyasaland*, p. 126; Werner, *Natives of British Central Africa*, p. 281; Wiese, *Geschichte . . . der Angoni*, pp. 181–6; Winterbottom, *Angoni Paramountcy*, pp. 126–7; Young, *History of the Tumbuka-Kamanga*, pp. 108–17.

[114] [3] I worked among these people for a year in 1946–7 as an Assistant Anthropologist of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.

[P. 194]

10: Barnes E-5 (1946-1949) 1959
FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

made in the regimental system, which was organized on a national basis. A person of low ethnic status, that is, of comparatively late incorporation into the tribe but of senior regiment, was considered to be, in most circumstances, as good as a man of more aristocratic family but of a junior regiment. New regiments were formed about every four years.

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Development of Minor Chieftainships

The defeat of the Ngoni army at the hands of the British in 1898 and the subsequent establishment of British control led to the partial breakdown of this system. The population was dispersed by the fighting and by the unsettled conditions that followed, and part of the kingdom was cleared for European occupation. The Administration recognized the grandson of Mpezeni I as the chief of the tribe, and also worked through a number of men known as Divisional Headmen, who were made responsible for small areas. Some of these divisional headmen were regional governors, some lieutenants of Mpezeni, some members of the royal lineage, and others were upstarts. It is not clear from the rather meagre records that remain or from the statements of informants exactly what happened between 1898 and 1914, but we know that by the latter date the Administration had come to recognize six men as local chiefs, apart from Mpezeni, and that four of them were said to be sons of Mpezeni I.[1] In 1929, when the term Native Authority was introduced, nine minor chiefs were appointed, of whom four were descended from Mpezeni I and one from the father of Mpezeni I. Two of the other minor chiefs have the descent-name *jere* that belongs to the royal lineage, and may be regarded as belonging to assimilated lineages. One is descended from a regional governor, the other from a policeman. Two minor chiefs do not have this descent-name, one being descended from a lieutenant of Zwangendaba and the other from a regional governor. This arrangement of one Paramount Chief and nine minor chiefs persists to the present day. With each of the ten chiefs is associated a more or less defined area within which most of the villages are said to belong to the chief of the area. What appears to have happened during the thirty years after the conquest is that the central power declined and that certain political and territorial segments achieved a degree of autonomy. The ten areas belonging to the different chiefs, which I shall refer to as counties, represent

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[1] Conhead, *Native Tribes*, pp. 22 and 24.

10: Barnes E-5 (1946-1949) 1959
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Mpezeni

ten units of different orders of segmentation in the old system and are now regarded as ten homologous territorial segments in the new. Thus one village founded for a group of queens by Mpezeni I has given rise to two royal chieftainships, another to one royal chieftainship, and a third to a royal chieftainship and a non-royal one. On the other hand, there is no chieftainship corresponding to the son of Mpezeni I who was next in succession to the main heir.

There are royal villages in every county. The oldest royal village in a county is now the capital of the county, and the lieutenants in the capital are responsible to the county chief. The minor chiefs have continued the process of making new villages for their queens, so that in each county the chief lives in a recently formed royal village, founded either by himself or by his father, and not in his capital. The capital is often the biggest village in the county, while the chief's village is more frequently quite small. It is the name of the capital village rather than that of the chief's village that serves as the name of the county itself. Thus, while in the old days the national capital changed with each new Paramount, the county capitals do not alter. The new royal villages founded since 1898 have not the same importance in the political structure as had the pre-conquest royal villages. This change is reflected in the fact that there is now no real national capital in the old sense.

Disputes in the old days were settled in the village by the headman, or were taken to the regional governor, or to the lieutenants of the royal village, for settlement. If the matter could not be settled there it was taken to the assembly of the senior lieutenants of Mpezeni, whose decision could be set aside only by Mpezeni himself. Now each chief has a court, and there is an appeal court on which representatives from each of the ten counties sit in turn. In the old days important decisions were taken by the senior lieutenants, in consultation with Mpezeni, although the four large royal villages were to some extent independent of one another. Sections of the army, for instance, appear to have been sent out on raids from a royal village without reference to the Paramount.[1] Under the present régime meetings of the tribe as a whole are held at Mcumo, a centre established by the Administration at which there is a school and a dispensary. These are attended by the chiefs and such people as choose to come. These meetings are usually sponsored by the Administration, and meetings to discuss affairs that arise independently of the Administration are

[1] Cf. Genthe, *A Trip to Mpezeni's*, p. 1.

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Circa

1889. Mpezeni visited by Sir Alfred Sharp.

1890. Death of Mtwalo.

1891. Death of Mombera. Chikusi, son of Mputa, deposed. Mperembe acting chief of Mombera's Ngoni.

1893. Birth of Chitou Mpezeni Jere, son of Tsingu Jere by his wife, Nkuchwa. Matebele War.

1894. Death of Lobengula Kumalo.

1895. Ngungunyana, King of the Abu-Gaza, deposed by the Portuguese.

1896. Matabele Rebellion. Defeat of Mwase at Kasungu by Alston and Swann.

1897. Ngoni Revolt. British South Africa Company at Chinunda (Fort Jameson Dist.)

1898. Mpezeni surrenders; exiled to Fort Manning. Tsingu Jere captured and shot. Nkuchwa, his wife, shot by Lt. Poole's troop in the Vubvi Valley. Revolt ended. Fort Jameson established.

1900. Mpezeni I. released and returned to his village. Death of Mpezeni I. Death of Senera Nqumayo, mother of Ntatu Mpezeni Jere (Mpezeni I) and widow of Chief Zongendaba.

1901. Succession of Chitou Mpezeni II (Jere).

1903. Chief Mwimawe claims the name of Zongendaba, but is refused by the Government.

1904. Death of Lupoko, wife of Mpezeni, at Lupoko village.

1908. Death of Ngungunyana.

1925. Chitou Mpezeni II present at the indaba given in honour of H.R.H. The Prince of Wales at Broken Hill, N. Rhodesia.

1934. The Paramount, Chitou Mpezeni II, presented with his "Staff of Office" by H.R.H. Prince George at Livingstone, N. Rhodesia.

1935. Great meeting of old Ngoni chiefs with Paramount Chief, Mpezeni II, to discuss the chief's ancestors and the crossing of the Zambesi river in 1835. This being the Centenary. The Ngoni were well acquainted with native dug-outs (boats) before they left their tribal area which is now known as Northern Rhodesia. [501]

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Authorities consulted:—Bryant; Elliott; Seymour; Thomas; Marshall Hole; Tlusi.

12: Barnes--1 E-5 (1946-1948) 1948 FR5 Ngoni FR5 Mpezeni

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The Material Culture of the Fort Jameson Ngoni

I

During the 1820s, the rise to power of the Zulu chief Chaka in South Africa led to a number of migrations to the north led by lesser chiefs who wished to avoid a clash with the Zulu armies, or who had already clashed and had been defeated. The descendants of these migrants are to-day living scattered over East Africa, from Lake Victoria to near Lourenço Marques. Many of these still call themselves Ngoni, a term derived from Nguni, a word used to describe themselves while they were still in the south. The leader of one of these Ngoni migrations was Zwangendaba, and it is his descendants who are to be found in Northern Rhodesia and elsewhere at the present time. The only group in this country recognised as Ngoni by the Administration is to be found in Fort Jameson District, under Paramount Chief Mpezeni. Formerly a tribe living in Lundazi District under Chief Magodi was officially called Ngoni, but they are now known to the Administration as Tumbuka. They represent the western salient of the old empire of Mombera, a son of Zwangendaba, whose descendant is now a chief in Nyasaland. This article deals only with the people under Chief Mpezeni.

Zwangendaba led his people northwards, fighting and taking captives as he went, crossed the Zambezi in 1835, an event that happened to coincide with a solar eclipse, and after passing through the present-day Eastern Province, died near Lake Tanganyika in about 1845. His party then split up, one son, Mpezeni, leading his followers south-westwards towards the Bemba and the Wisa in the Northern Province. From there they moved southwards, crossed the Luangwa, and settled in Petauke District. In about 1865 they moved eastwards and settled to the north of the Mpangwe Hills in Fort Jameson District. Some ten years later they went further east, and in 1881, when they were first visited by a European, they had reached

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a point some fifteen miles south of Fort Jameson. It seems likely 175
that another eastward move was being contemplated when in 1898
they clashed with troops from Nyasaland, and were defeated. Al- 131
ready the territory under the control of Mpezeni stretched across the
Luangwa-Shire watershed, and with the establishment of British rule
in the same year, that portion of Mpezeni's domain lying across the
watershed became detached from the main portion which lay in
Northern Rhodesia. The Nyasaland section of the empire is now con- 631
trolled by two independent Ngoni chieftainships, both in the Fort
Manning area of Lilongwe District. In this Territory, the present
Paramount Chief is a great-grandson of the first Mpezeni.

/4/ Like all the Ngoni groups, Mpezeni's people are the result 648
of much intermarriage between the southern migrants and the Central
Bantu people with whom they fought. In particular, Mpezeni's
Ngoni intermarried a great deal with the Nsenga of Petauke District,
and it is the Nsenga language that is spoken to-day in Ngoni villages, 199
rather than the old Ngoni language, akin to Zulu, which is used only
in praises and songs. Cicewa is spoken in some villages which at
the time of the arrival of the Europeans had been incorporated only
a short time into the Ngoni state and had not had time to lose their
own Chewa tongue.

The principal difference between the Ngoni and their surround- 642
ing neighbours is in their form of centralised chieftainship, inherited
from father to son. Under the Paramount Chief are nine minor chiefs, 631
positions created by the British South Africa Company's administration,
and held by descendants in the male line of Zwangendaba and his
important officials. Until about 1920 there were divisional head-
men in charge of a number of villages, but these posts have now
disappeared. In a village there is a headman, an hereditary position 602
in the male line, and often one or two assistants, also hereditary 629
offices, descended from captives of the original headman who had
been promoted to responsible office.

In the old days one of the principal ways in which the diverse 701
elements within the Ngoni state were unified was through the regi-
mental system. Regiments were formed every so many years on a

13:Fraser M-5 (ca. 1890)1901
FR5 Ngoni FR5

VI.—*The Zulu of Nyasaland: their Manners and Customs.* By the Rev. DONALD FRASER, of the Livingstonia Mission.

[Read before the Society, 20th February, 1901.]

101 I SHALL take you to-night into British Central Africa, and describe slightly, a most interesting nation of warriors who live in West Nyasaland. To reach them we sail up the Zambezi, and the 13 Shiré to Lake Nyasa. Landing at Bandawe, we strike inland for two days, climbing most of the way. After passing through richly wooded hills and valleys, we arrive at a great plateau, veined by constant sudden ravines through which rivers roar in the wet season, and trickle in the dry. The plateau is almost bared of trees, and is relieved by huge rocky hills which rise precipitously, from the plain. A low scrub covers the face of the land except where [241] gardens are being cultivated, and the whole country is dotted by innumerable ant hills, each as large as a cottage. These are hoed by the villagers, and throughout most of the year, stand out gaunt and bear. Then the landscape is thirsty and inhospitable looking. The earth baked and hard, lies unclothed in the blazing sun. Cattle, [231] sheep, and goats, wander about the river beds, and one looks almost in vain for any sign of vegetation to afford them food. But when the first rains come, the land breaks into smiling. The scrub puts [241] on a dress of the softest green. The gardens and ant hills are covered with springing maize, and a thick garment of foliage, vegetation, and flowers, hides every vestige of the ground. Here we stand from 4,000 to 5,000 feet above the level of the sea. In the cold season, the thermometer falls as low as 40°, and in the hot, rises as high as 98°. But though the sun has a dangerous bite in midsummer, the heat is never oppressive, and the nights are cool and refreshing.

101 The people who live in this country, are a branch of the Zulu 15 tribe, who started north 70 or 80 years ago on a great raid. The causes which led them to desert their own country are wrapped in mystery, and even the old men who can remember the days when they crossed the Zambezi, are unable to give any clear account of their starting. Probably it arose from one of the wars of Chaka, in

13:Fraser M-5 (ca. 1890) 1901
FR5 Ngoni FR5

which his army was defeated. The warriors knew that they would be killed when they got back to the great Zulu despot, and so they fled north, fighting as they went. As they went along, they conquered and absorbed the tribes, gathering Swazi, Atonga, and a medley of people into the nation. They came to the Zambezi, and on the day when they crossed it they were terrified by a total eclipse of the sun. From the Zambezi they fought their way to Nyasaland, then striking west, they passed through the Senga and Wemba populations till they reached Lake Tanganyika. On the plateau there the first great chief died. He had become infirm in his latter days, and travelled about riding on an ox. At his funeral a terrible massacre took place. One section of the tribe, eager to observe the old bloody funeral ceremonies, surprised and murdered all the widows of the chief that their spirits might accompany the dead chief to the other world. This butchery aroused great indignation among the others, and the tribe split in two. The butchers remained at the S.E. of Lake Tanganyika, where they still are a terror to the surrounding people. The great part of the tribe however, again marched south. One of the sons of the paramount chief was appointed his successor. His name was Mombera. His four brothers, Mpezeni, Mperembe, Maurau, and Mtwaro, were given large and powerful sub-chieftainships under him. This led to a scattering and readjustment of the tribe. Mperembe remained as chief and conquerer over the northern people, keeping the wild Wemba, and other tribes under his suzerainty. Mombera, along with two other brothers, settled in the highlands to the north-west of Nyasa. And Mpezeni went south and gradually got so far separated from the others that his people became an independent and insolated section of the tribe. A few years ago, the British Government levied war on Mpezeni, and his country came under the British Government.

In the north also, Mperembe was sore driven through his separation from the main section of the tribe, and at last his people rebelled, and with the aid of the Wemba, drove him south to join hands with his brother Mombera the paramount chief. Around Mombera the great part of the Ngoni nation remained. Some of his head men started petty chieftainships to the south among whom were Mandala, and Mwasi. Their people are called the Central and Southern Ngoni, and are well known in the Blantyre district as labourers, but they are not Ngoni. Few of them can speak the Zulu or Ngoni language, and they are a poor effeminate and cow-

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101 [175] ardly people compared with the wild spirits who remained under Mombera.

This tribe is variously named Mazitu, Vikoko, Abangoni, and so on, and readers of Livingstone's 'Zambezi and its Tributaries,' will remember his frequent references to the wild marauding bands of Mazitu. The word Abangoni, by which the tribe calls itself, [186] simply means "The people." They reckon themselves the blooded aristocrats of Africa.

[193] The prefix *aba* before ngoni, is simply the plural form of the noun *umgoni*, a single man. The country is called Ubungoni, and the language Chingoni. For the peculiarity of the Bantu languages, is that words alter their number from singular to plural, and character from noun to adjective, not by changing the suffix but the prefix.

197 The language which the Ngoni speak is a slight modification of Zulu—but they only use two clicks—the dental *c* and labial *q*. In our schools therefore we use the Zulu literature in which there are already nearly 40 volumes, and the best of these are the translations left by Bishop Colenso. Zulu is however rapidly dying [560] out, as the language of the slaves and of the surrounding tribes is becoming the vernacular of the common people. When Mombera's 175 Ngoni settled down in the watershed of the Ruhuru, they soon made their presence disagreeably felt throughout West Nyasa. Their marauding parties were always out on the war path. Dressing [1926] in a frightsome garb of cock feathers, carrying a large shield and two or three stabbing assegais, they terrorised the neighbouring tribes. They used to sleep near some village which they wished to attack, and then in the early morning just before the light had come, with a wild war whoop they would sweep through the village, killing the men and the old people; then when they had seized the women and children and tied them together they would start back for the hills, driving with them all the cattle and sheep and goats that they could find. Their fighting was never done in the open. It generally took the form of a wild and sudden rush, and in a moment bleeding corpses were lying about, and the village was in flames.

The terrified people betook themselves to huge stockaded villages, [101] others piled their villages in the lake itself. The Poka, and Henga fled to mountain fastnesses, and built on the edges of fearful precipices, the Sengs fled to the Luangwa marsh and built great protected villages in the depths of huge thorn thickets. And the land became

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barren with terror, till a great belt of uninhabited territory surrounded Ngoniland on all sides. It was sad to pass through this rich land, left to the wild beasts, to see mouldering smelting furnaces, and other signs of lost industries.

It was when the tribe was still in the height of its devastating tendencies that the Livingstonia Mission came into the country. At first the early pioneers were barely tolerated, and more than once it seemed as if they would have to abandom everything and flee for their lives. But gradually, imperceptibly the preaching of peace began to sweeten and purify the atmosphere, and the horrors of these fighting days became part and parcel of a dreadful past. Three years ago a new paramount chief was elected. At the great council the wild spirits of the tribe tried to rouse the people to celebrate the coronation with a great raid. They danced, threatened and raved, but the younger chiefs, themselves Christians, spoke eloquently for peace, and in the end peace prevailed, and the death knell of the past was sounded. And now there is no more settled, peaceable, law-abiding people in Central Africa. And this victory has been won not by the rattle of Maxim guns, not even by the wisdom of diplomacy, but by the daily teaching of the Gospel of Peace.

The political structure of the tribe is strong and conservative. The father of all the people is the paramount chief. His authority has descended to him through a long line of ancestors, the eldest son of the principal wife succeeding to his father's position. In some cases the head wife has had no sons, then she adopted a son of one of the other wives and he became the heir. The chief's power is nominally absolute, and he is surrounded with a certain regal dignity. It is impressive to see the aristocratic majesty that a great chief can maintain. Though his regal robes may not be more than a dirty bit of blue calico, which is not worth fourpence, he walks with a scornful dignity that any European prince might envy. When he listens in court to some great indaba his face is expressionless as granite, with an affected indifference he drinks from his great calabash of beer, and ladles ounces of snuff into his nostrils, while his poor subject pleads with passion and eloquence over a matter which may mean death or life to him. Yet behind his nominal power he is controlled and restrained by the voice of his council. His succession may be plain and acknowledged, yet he cannot assume the reins of government until he has been nominated by the sub-chiefs and councillors. Our present chief had to